BW: Strange presumption, strongly implying a Block Universe: if there are only objects between objects, rather than space, then the entire universe is a singular object, which is perpetually immobile. Usually, such a proposition is a characteristic of an Eternalist Theory, based on a four-dimensional space-time:
... but your description doesn't have space ... and therefore can't have time. If that's the case, then you can't have TWO objects interacting, ever.
TSW: "The word universe portrays a fundamental property of existence: interconnection."
BW: Every definition I can find is a variant of "All existing matter and space". Etymologically, Latin; uni- (all) -verse ~ -versus (turned) ... into one. The other meanings are variants or subsets of all Westmiller Things (Borchardt material objects, plus any motion, attribute, or process).
So, the concept doesn't "portray" any property, beyond ontological existence. It doesn't require or preclude interaction among any particular things, much less a physical "connection" among all Borchardt Things.
TSW: "After disconnecting the world conceptually (analysis), we put it back together again (synthesis)."
BW: The conceptual process isn't necessarily sequential and it is almost always "discriminating" (disconnecting) rather than compounding ("putting it back together"). It may be compounding in the sense of putting selected characteristics into a single word, but the *meaning* of the concept is always a process of identifying essential differentiating attributes.
For example, the definition of "horse" first establishes a category of being (animal) that is distinct from other things (Borchardt Things or Westmiller Things), then a distinct category of animal (mammal), then a distinct category of mammals (vegetarian), then a distinct category of vegetarian things that are solid-hoofed, domesticated, with a flowing mane and tail. There is no "synthesis" beyond assigning those characteristics to a single concept. A good definition ensures that the discriminating characteristics are, as a compound set, both unique and essential. You don't define "horse" as an object with legs ... which would be distinct from a stool ... even if legs are clearly a characteristic of horses.
TSW: "The philosophical choice we need to make is not between an assumption of continuity and an assumption of discontinuity, but between a deterministic assumption that includes both of those ideas and an indeterministic assumption that does not."
BW: In order to have a deterministic cause, there has to be an effect (a distinct event). If there is no event, then discontinuity is true. If there is an event, then there is some cause. The cause doesn't have to be any continuous "connection", only a momentary interaction (usually a collision). Granted, some causes for some events are continuous (gravity), but that isn't required. It isn't "idealism" to observe no event, or an effect, that is the result of momentary interactions.
BW: If we recognize that concepts are *entirely* differentiation, there's no problem in distinguishing the *separation* of objects (a Westmiller Thing) from the objects themselves (a Borchardt Thing). Asserting that there is "space" between the Earth and Moon simply says they are separated, not that the space is "completely empty" of all other, incidental, objects. Nor does it say that they are "completely isolated", since everyone knows that they are gravitationally connected and persistently exchange photons. You seem to be fabricating an inconsistency that doesn't exist: Borchardt Things separated by space doesn't require space to be empty.
TSW: "As I see it, an 'element of spatial extent' can represent one of two possibilities: either it is something or it is nothing."
BW: It is a Westmiller Thing, not a Borchardt Thing; attributes are things; separation is an attribute of two objects (otherwise they would be one object). Totally independent of that attribute is the issue of whether the separation (space) also contains other Borchardt Things. It probably does, but they are irrelevant to the Separation Thing.
TSW: "If an 'element of spatial extent' is something, then it must have matter within it ..."
BW: Not at all. Westmiller Things are not containers, they are relationships among Borchardt Things. Separation is not a material object that "contains" anything. It is not a constraint, it is an attribute. Of course, Westmiller Things also include Borchardt Things, but attributes themselves don't necessarily have attributes. (That was one of Einstein's logical errors: giving "separation" an attribute of "curved" in "space".)
BW: If there is solid, continuous matter between two objects, they aren't two objects. It might be one object with two or three different parts, but it can't be considered two distinct Borchardt Things. Yet, that seems to be what you're asserting is true: that "all things are interconnected"; physically linked or attached. If that is the case, there aren't two distinct objects anywhere in the universe. In that case, there can't be determinism, because there can be no cause and effect, because there can be no action between distinct objects.
BW: You do phrase it slightly differently in the prior case: "between any two objects exist other objects that transmit matter and motion." Nevertheless, the word "any" precludes the possibility of transmission from one object to the next, because there is always some smaller Borchardt Thing between them, to infinity. The statements you're contrasting seem to me absolutely the same: a Block Universe.
BW: Beyond that, the second clause of the quote above says the opposing view proposes "empty, discontinuous space" between objects. This makes no sense. If space is completely empty, it is continuously empty, not "discontinuously empty", which is a self-contradictory phrase.
Continued as 12b…