20101202

The Uncertainty Principle and the Death of Classical Mechanics

Hello Glenn,

Upon further consideration, I believe the Uncertainty Principle is somewhat correct. For example,

"Suppose that we want to measure the position and speed of an object — for example a car going through a radar speed trap. Naively, we assume that the car has a definite position and speed at a particular moment in time, and how accurately we can measure these values depends on the quality of our measuring equipment — if we improve the precision of our measuring equipment, we will get a result that is closer to the true value. In particular, we would assume that how precisely we measure the speed of the car does not affect its position, and vice versa."

Because every microcosm affects every other microcosm, any measuring device would have some effect on the microcosm being measured. In the case of the car and the radar gun, the effect would be infinitesimally small. Nonetheless, there would be a very small distortion in the measurement.

However, in the case of electrons -- being measured with devices with accuracy no greater than an electron -- the distortions could be large. This is probably what Heisenberg encountered. The degree of uncertainty must always depend on the precision of the measuring device compared to the composition of the microcosm being measured.

Regards,

Steve



Steve:

Thanks for your comment. I disagree only a little bit—I would leave out the “somewhat.” The Uncertainty Principle is correct, as your examples clearly show. It is only the interpretation of what this means that could possibly be incorrect. As you know, there have been two different interpretations: 1. Uncertainty is an indication that Aristotle’s absolute chance actually occurs (the Copenhagen view) or 2. Uncertainty is a sign of observer ignorance (Bohm’s view). As I explained under UNCERTAINTY (in TSW), the first is indeterministic and incorrect and the second is deterministic and correct.

The development of the Uncertainty Principle actually meant that classical mechanics, being dependent on finite causality, was no longer valid, becoming particularly noticeable in the micro world. None of the equations of classical mechanics could produce perfectly precise results. The plus or minus in all experimental results was not an indication of nature’s probability, but an indication that nature was infinite. Being reluctant to face that ultimate conclusion, physicists trained in classical mechanics overwhelmingly favored the wrong interpretation, albeit with much argumentation based mostly on presuppositions, rather than assumptions. After the Uncertainty Principle, science had to be guided by infinite universal causality (CAUSALITY, in TSW). As classical determinists had maintained all along, there were causes for all effects. What they did not grasp was that, with the universe being infinitely subdividable, there were an infinite number of causes for all effects. Thus the erroneous Copenhagen view survives to this day merely because modern physics cannot embrace the assumption of INFINITY.