Critique of "The Scientific Worldview": Part 6d The Ten Assumptions of Science: Inseparability

Energy as a calculation, not as matterless motion. Relativity borne of a fixed aether test and Einstein's objectification of motion.

I am ever so grateful to Bill Westmiller, whose comments are in bold. The quotes marked TSW are from "The Scientific Worldview":

TSW: "At such a juncture one can assume ... that the carrier exists, or one can assume ... that until one is found, a carrier does not exist."

BW: ALL evidence establishes the fact that energy is matter in motion, even if the matter cannot be conveniently measured. There is no evidence of anything called "energy" that has no "carrier". Therefore, the former proposition must be an "unmitigated truth" and the latter an "unmitigated fallacy" of supernatural powers.

[GB: Sorry Bill, but energy is not “matter in motion.” Energy is a calculation. We use it to describe the motion of matter. For instance, we use it to describe the conversion of the motion of falling water to the motion of the turbine and thence to the motion of electricity. In each case, the motion of one kind of matter is transferred to another kind of matter. I am glad that you do agree that there is always a carrier and that there are no supernatural powers involved.] 

TSW: "... when this same motion appears as infrared radiation, it is considered neither as matter, nor as the motion of matter, but as matter-motion, a mysterious, massless wave-particle capable of traveling through 'empty space'."

BW: Light of every frequency is, of course, matter in motion. It must be so, since it is demonstrably energetic. The actual dispute is whether light is particles (photons) in motion or a transfer of kinetic wave energy between (aether) particles. In UT [1], it is neither; it is a "linear stack" of fundamental particles in both rotary and translational motion, which gives it two energy components (necessarily related to frequency).

[GB: Bill, you need to rethink this. Like you say, light is either a particle or the motion of particles. By using the agnostic’s approach you say “it is neither,” but then go on to say it is a stack of particles. I am confused. Is this the fixed aether disproven by MM87 [2]? Do these particles move from source to observer as in Einstein’s particle theory? Or do they provide the medium for wave motion in which they remain relatively fixed, simply allowing the waves to pass through as sound waves do through air (and aether)?]

TSW: "In contrast, these same physicists hold a clear view of other types of motion. Sound, for instance, is not considered matter or matter-motion."

BW: ... but it is a transfer of kinetic energy between particles in a wave ... which is no longer "mysterious". I think the most critical mistake in modern physics is considering light to be equivalent to sound or water waves, even if that happens to be convenient to mathematical modeling. There is no "aether" in UT.

[GB: That didn’t help. I am still confused. It is not the transfer of energy, it is the transfer of motion, which I agree is not mysterious. Sorry, but regressive physics does not consider light to be motion. They still think it is a particle (or do you think that they have recently given up on Einstein’s photon?). Hope you don’t waste too much time on perfectly empty space in developing your Unimid Theory.]

TSW: "it is nonsense to consider, as the Big Bang cosmogonists do, that the universe was once devoid of matter, consisting only of radiation."

BW: I don't think that's the currently popular theory. It's either the quantum "something from nothing" theory, or a "collision" of immaterial energy "membranes" theory. Toss in the collapse of probabilistic "wavefunctions" in the "many-worlds" theory to round out the mystical set of immaterial propositions.

[GB: Comme ci comme ça. As you say: “Pass the Bong.”]

TSW: "Thus we may see matter, but we can only infer motion. Motion cannot be sensed, for it is not a thing. Only things can be sensed."

BW: Ooops. I think you just violated your own axiom. We never "see matter", we only sense the radiation it emits or reflects. We don't really "feel matter" either: we perceive a neuron stimulation. In other words, we can only sense *matter in motion*, not matter itself, nor motion itself. That's *inseparability*. You do get it right when you talk about "Thing-Events", though I would call it a literal collision, rather than mere "convergence", and "divergence" only occurs as a consequence of a collision.

[GB: Ooops, Ooops. Disagree. Your definition of radiation amounts to matterless motion, which cannot occur. Granted, it is consistent with regressive physics, which denies the existence of the aether particles that are the carriers necessary for the transmission of the motion of matter called radiation. What you propose is tantamount to ESP. On the contrary, all our senses rely on the collisions produced by matter in motion. For instance, thin hairs in our ears must receive collisions from the nitrogen and oxygen molecules in air. Our eyes receive aethereal impacts whose frequencies we associate with colors of the spectrum. Sorry, but “divergence” is nothing less than the inertial motion of Newton’s First Law and its derivative, the Second Law of Thermodynamics. You are right, of course, that all inertial motion is the consequence of previous collisions. In an infinite universe, there are always plenty of these to go around.]

TSW: "But, as noted before, the idea of existence applies only to matter. Only things exist; events do not."

BW: Ooops. Contradicting yourself. Earlier, you said matter *requires* motion and motion *requires* matter. If motion doesn't exist, by your assertion, then matter can't exist. I disagree with your earlier proposition, but here you're talking ontology.

[GB: Disagree of course. You need to know the difference between “existence” and “occurrence.” Existence refers only to microcosms, portions of the universe with xyz dimensions and location with respect to other microcosms. Occurrence refers only to what those microcosms do. What they do is not “part” of the universe, it is what those parts do. This is why time, being motion, does not exist, only the things that produce that motion can exist. For instance, legs exist, but running does not. I can put legs in my back pocket, but I cannot put running in my back pocket. These ideas are very simple, but appear to be incomprehensible to those well indoctrinated by regressive physics. Reread EMIPE [3]. It takes a while. Eventually you will get it.]

BW: Existence is not limited to material objects. Their relative or absolute motion also exists, though it cannot exist in the absence of matter. An "event" cannot happen in the absence of both matter and motion, which results in a collision, whether perceived or not. So, the signing of the Declaration of Independence was an event that existed as a "thing" when matter (ink) moved (from a quill) to paper.

[GB: Sorry. Same problem. Signing is not a thing, it is an action. As I had to explain in TPMOE [4], all languages contain nouns (the matter part) and verbs (the motion part). The problem arises when we are forced to use nouns when naming motion, as in an “event.” Nevertheless, naming a motion does not turn it into matter. At least, you are not as radical as the physicist who proclaimed in a public meeting that the event of my birth existed, but that I did not!]

TSW: "That the word 'structure' can be found so remote from the word 'function' betrays a rejection of inseparability and an indication that the language of indeterminism is being spoken."

BW: Well said. I agree.

(Note: I AGREE with everything I do NOT quote, which is ~90% of what you write.)

TSW: "An 'object' surrounded by 'empty space' would have no mass just as it would have no velocity. Mass, like velocity, is dependent on the existence and motion of other things."

BW: Disagree. Mass is not *dependent* on motion, even if motion is *inseparable* from mass ... as explained above.

[GB: Disagree, as mentioned previously. One only has to examine the First Law of motion, P=mv, which describes the inertial motion of a body as it travels through space. If the velocity, v, were 0, then the momentum, P, would be 0, which could only be imagined by an idealist such as yourself and Newton, on one of his worst days. He did not need to include the idealization of a “body at rest” in formulating the law. Of course, this is a bit harsh on Newton, since it has taken a multitude of experiments and observations to convince determinists, at least, that there is not a single “body at rest” anywhere. I will have to say this much, you certainly are consistent in your idealism.]

TSW: "Under materialism, we assumed that the universe consists of matter. As mentioned, matter is defined as an abstraction for 'all things.'

BW: I'd prefer "all objects", taking into account my view of motion as a "thing" with characteristics distinct (though inseparable) from matter. The abstraction for "all things" is "universe". Etymologically, the unity of everything we can converse about (whether observed or not) ... or: all things that exist.

[GB: Bill, I can’t imagine how something which is not a thing could be separable and inseparable at the same time. Note that if I want to talk about the universe, then I will use the word “universe.” You are right that the universe consists of “all things,” which I prefer to use as an abstraction for matter. It seems that your resistance is based on your imagined finite particle, which is filled with a sort of crème pie filling called “solid matter.” Because I disagree with that idea, which is based on microcosmic finity, I continually emphasize that matter is an abstraction in the same way that fruit is an abstraction. One can never eat a fruit; one can only eat a specific kind of fruit, an apple or orange, perhaps.]

Next: Inseparability Part 4 of 5

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[1] UT is "Unimid Theory," version of Finite Particle Theory currently being formulated by Bill Westmiller.

[2] Michelson, A.A., and Morley, E.W., 1887, On the relative motion of the earth and the luminiferous ether: American Journal of Science, v. 39, p. 333-345.

[3] EMIPE is Borchardt, Glenn, 2011, Einstein's most important philosophical error, in Proceedings of the Natural Philosophy Alliance, 18th Conference of the NPA, 6-9 July, 2011 ( http://www.worldsci.org/pdf/abstracts/abstracts_5991.pdf ), College Park, MD, Natural Philosophy Alliance, Mt. Airy, MD, p. 64-68.

[4] TPMOE is Borchardt, Glenn, 2009, The physical meaning of  E=mc² ( http://www.scientificphilosophy.com/Downloads/The%20Physical%20Meaning%20of%20E%20=%20mc2.pdf ): Proceedings of the Natural Philosophy Alliance, v. 6, no. 1, p. 27-31.

Critique of "The Scientific Worldview": Part 6c The Ten Assumptions of Science: Inseparability

The case for miracles: Matter without motion, finity, perfectly empty space, and mass increase with velocity.

I am ever so grateful to Bill Westmiller, whose comments are in bold. The quotes marked TSW are from "The Scientific Worldview"[1]:

TSW: "Illegitimacy arises only when we incorrectly assume that the success of the approximation indicates the actual existence of the ideal."

BW: I think your labels are upside down. It is the "idealism" that matter requires motion that is in error, not the evident fact that heat falls with diminishing electron interaction. I do think it's a mistake to equate "zero heat emissions" with zero election collisions, even if there is zero atomic entropy. In UT[2], it is practically impossible to stop all motion, simply because the precision of aiming fundamental particles to cause that result bumps up against UP[3].

[GB: Huh? Are you still suggesting that matter could exist without motion? Want to give up plate tectonics too? No one has ever found a single bit of matter that is not in motion. Why, everything in the universe is constantly moving. Neutrons wobble, electrons and planets revolve, and the solar system, the Milky Way, and galactic clusters are constantly spinning. As we explained in UCT[4] and NGT[5], vortex motion is the essence of the entire material hierarchy. In an infinite universe, of course, we can never prove that all matter is in motion and therefore requires motion, but it is an obviously successful assumption. Your statement that “It is the "idealism" that matter requires motion that is in error” clearly puts you in the indeterministic camp. You will have many friends there. On Sundays, you can denigrate evolution, which is simply the motion of matter that you think unnecessary. Let me give you both barrels on why matter must always be in motion:

Why Finite Particles Cannot Exist

Because everything in the visible world clearly is in motion, the idea that matter could exist without motion depends on the unseen world of the imagined finite particle. There are several critical problems with this:

1.                 All things in the universe are subject to the Second Law of Thermodynamics (SLT), which states that the entropy or disorder of an isolated system can only increase. In neomechanics, of course, we see the SLT as a restatement of Newton’s First Law of Motion, and interpret this to mean that the various parts (submicrocosms) within a microcosm have a tendency to diverge from that microcosm. Finite particles, however, do not have any parts, so they present an unprecedented violation of the SLT, which has never been falsified.

2.                 Despite the failures of the atomists and of accelerators to discover the ultimate finite particle, the idea remains popular. That is because the current scientific world view of the mainstream is systems philosophy, with its tendency to overemphasize systems and underemphasize environments. That view is consupponible with the idea of gravitational attraction, wherein massive, seemingly solipsistic, ego-centered bodies gather in smaller bodies as if with outreached arms. The physical mechanism for attraction remains a mystery. One wonders what holds the imagined solid matter of the finite particle together. These finite microcosms certainly do not need any help from the macrocosm—their conjurers generally believe in perfectly empty space, which is the idealistic counterpart to the imagined solid matter.

3.                 The finite particle idea is a gross violation of univironmental determinism (UD), the philosophy and universal mechanism of evolution stating that what happens to a portion of the universe is equally dependent on the infinite matter in motion within and without. Thus, a microcosm is not “held together” by anything inside it, but by interactions with its macrocosm. A microcosm requires its macrocosm for its integrity. Perfectly empty space will not do. All microcosms are like beating hearts, expanding and contracting in response to changes in the macrocosm. This observation is seen throughout nature, but here are simple examples: Salt crystals in a saturated solution shrink and swell in response to dilution and concentration. If we add water, the crystals will dissolve; if we remove water, they will recrystallize. Minerals that attained their integrity at high temperature and pressure lose much of it when they are brought to the surface of the earth. The new macrocosm contributes to the formation of entirely new low-temperature minerals that generally are hydrated and/or oxidized.

Carrying forth the above ideas, Steve and I speculated that univironmental interactions were responsible for the production of ordinary (baryonic) matter (UCT, NGT). We began by assuming that baryonic matter could not pop up out of nowhere, despite the special pleading of Big Bangers. Every observation in science involves the transformation of one kind of matter into another kind of matter. If you just read NGT, you will see that infinity allowed us to hypothesize an infinite aethereal series, with the first set, aether_-1 being the constituents that form the complexes we see as baryonic matter. On the other hand, the finite particle has no aether and no possible mechanism for its production. The finite particle is the counterpart to the finite universe. The upshot is that the Finite Particle Theory (FPT) and the Big Bang Theory (BBT) are consupponible. Both require the formation of something from nothing.

TSW: "... the mere multiplication of a term for matter and a term for motion really does not guarantee their conceptual unification any more than the designation of matter and motion as separate terms guarantees their physical independence."

BW: ... nor their conceptual or physical *dependence*. I'll agree to "inseparability", but not the dependence of matter on motion.

[GB: Read it again: inseparability assumes that just as there is no motion without matter, so there is no matter without motion, period. Logically, one cannot both accept it and not accept it at the same time. I suppose you could cherry-pick it in the same way that some folks choose either microcosmic infinity or macrocosmic infinity, but not both, but that is not logical either. That would require a completely different set of assumptions containing an ad hock, arbitrary division based only on scale.]

 
TSW: "... the all-too-common, but misleading, view that matter is equivalent to energy. This cannot be true because the term for matter (mass) in Einstein‘s equation never appears without the term for motion (velocity of light squared)."

BW: True, but (as noted above) Einstein's equation certainly suggests that matter (mass) increases with increased velocity, to a specific finite limit: c² (the only velocity that isn't relative in SRT[6]). Even Feynman, who I greatly admire, believes that the mass of particles increase with velocity in linear accelerators. (It does, but only because it is acquiring mass from the matter in magnetic fields.)

[GB: Bill, please reread my paper on “The Physical Meaning of E=mc²”.[7] Particles cannot magically gain mass simply because they are travelling fast. You are right at implying that any mass acquired by a microcosm has to be a result of interactions with the macrocosm. Of course, the acquired mass would be expected to remain after the acceleration is over. It wouldn't just magically disappear either. However, I am not aware that any accelerated particles are larger or heavier after the experiment is over. I prefer this explanation:

Mass Increase with Velocity

When studying anything having to do with Einstein and relativity, one must first understand his philosophical assumptions. Einstein was not only a solipsist and an immaterialist, he was foremost a positivist of the operationalist stripe. This is why he was continually fixated on the observer and reference frames. This excessively empirical standpoint may be summed up like this: if a thing or motion cannot be measured, it does not exist or occur. This view is still common among aether deniers today even though they forget that he initially based his denial on his mistaken assumption that the MM87[8] test of a fixed aether also meant that there was no entrained aether as well. It also is the reason Einstein denied simultaneity. He was correct that simultaneity cannot be proven through measurement. For instance, we cannot prove through direct measurement that Earth and Sun exist at the same time. Light takes 8 minutes to travel from Sun to Earth. By the time we see the Sun, it is no longer in that same spot because of the rotation of Earth. Thus, if the Sun happened to disappear a minute ago, we would still see its image for another 7 minutes.

In view of this, we need to look at mass and how it is determined. Mass essentially is the resistance of a microcosm to the impact of other microcosms. Pretty simple: it is harder to move a heavy object than a light object. The measurement, however, is not so simple. About the simplest case would involve a collider with momentum P=mv, where m is mass and v is velocity. One example would be this: Suppose you were a football player who got hit in the back, being knocked 5 yards and falling on your face. You would not be able to tell whether the player who hit you was a 300 lb lineman going at moderate velocity or a 150 lb linebacker going at high velocity. You would know little about the other player’s mass or velocity, but way too much about his momentum. To calculate the mass of the collider from his effect on your body (kinetic energy, KE=1/2 mv²), you would have to know his velocity. We do this all the time when we weigh ourselves (weight is W=mg). The weight that we get is dependent on where we are in the universe. On Earth, we generally assume that the acceleration due to gravity is about 9.81 m/s². Still, the so-called gravitational “constant,” g, is not a constant, varying constantly from place to place. It decreases with altitude, so if you want to weigh less, just take the measurement flying at 30,000 feet—over water.

Back to mass variation with velocity. I have not yet studied this in detail, but wouldn't be surprised if it had to do with Einstein’s erroneous assumption that the velocity of light is constant. Nonetheless, because everything in the universe is always in motion, there are no constants in nature, as Steve and I argued in UCT. Of course, idealists who believe in constants also must believe that there could be matter without motion, finity, and perfectly empty space. If one assumes a constant velocity, then the equations of physics can only explain practical results by assuming that other measurements are not constant. Thus, in the simplest case, if the momentum of a microcosm, P=mv, increased after a collision, I normally would suspect that its velocity had increased. If v was constant, however, I would have no choice but to blame it on an increase in mass. This would be strange indeed—seemingly miraculous. As a materialist, of course, I would not accept that. There would have to be some physical reason for the mass increase (chunks of matter added to the microcosm during the collision?), which never was explained by Einstein, Feynman, or other immaterialists.]

Next: Inseparability Part 3 of 5

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[1] Borchardt, Glenn, 2007, The scientific worldview: Beyond Newton and Einstein ( http://www.scientificphilosophy.com/The%20Scientific%20Worldview.html ): Lincoln, NE, iUniverse, 411 p.

[2] UT is Unimid Theory is a version of Finite Particle Theory currently being formulated by Bill Westmiller.

[3] UP is the Heisenberg Uncertainty Principle.

[4] UCT is Puetz, S.J., and Borchardt, Glenn, 2011, Universal cycle theory: Neomechanics of the hierarchically infinite universe: Denver, Outskirts Press ( www.universalcycletheory.com ), 626 p.

[5] NGT is Borchardt, Glenn, and Puetz, S.J., 2012, Neomechanical gravitation theory ( http://www.worldsci.org/pdf/abstracts/abstracts_6529.pdf ), in Volk, Greg, Proceedings of the Natural Philosophy Alliance, 19th Conference of the NPA, 25-28 July: Albuquerque, NM, Natural Philosophy Alliance, Mt. Airy, MD, v. 9, p. 53-58.

[6] SRT is Special Relativity Theory.

[7] Borchardt, Glenn, 2009, The physical meaning of  E=mc² ( http://www.scientificphilosophy.com/Downloads/The%20Physical%20Meaning%20of%20E%20=%20mc2.pdf ): Proceedings of the Natural Philosophy Alliance, v. 6, no. 1, p. 27-31.

[8] Michelson, A.A., and Morley, E.W., 1887, On the relative motion of the earth and the luminiferous ether: American Journal of Science, v. 39, p. 333-345.

Critique of "The Scientific Worldview": Part 6b The Ten Assumptions of Science: Inseparability

Energy as matterless motion, dialectics dissed by indeterminists, and the discovery of motion in biology (Darwin) and sociology (Marx).

I am ever so grateful to Bill Westmiller, whose comments are in bold. The quotes marked TSW are from "The Scientific Worldview[1]":

BW: I suspect that you're too firmly attached to "dialectical unity" as a fundamental characteristic of nature. While dialectic discourse is a valuable Platonic tool in the pursuit of truth, it's a quality of human analytical review, not a quality of nature, as Hegel, Marx, and Engels supposed.

[GB: Bill, you better believe that us univironmental determinists are attached to dialectics as a fundamental characteristic of nature. That’s why dialectical discourse, like we are having, is possible in the first place. The only way that would not be the case would be to divorce humanity from nature, positing “freewill” to invoke “The Myth of Exceptionalism[2].” We make progress by viewing opposing arguments side-by-side as we are doing and as I did in TTAOS[3]. This helps folks to see the choices necessary for clear thinking. Dialectics most certainly rules the universe, as many have noted for millennia: Ying and Yang, attraction and repulsion, microcosm and macrocosm, convergence and divergence, small and large, slow and fast, right and wrong, and on and on… Just because some philosophers you despise emphasized dialectics is hardly a logical reason to reject it.]

TSW: "... mechanists went so far as to promise a complete description of the world."

BW: LaPlace did make an error in positing "An intellect which at any given moment knew all of the forces that animate nature ...", which is omniscience, which is impossible for man or God. But, it isn't relevant whether anyone *knows* the cause of all things, or anything in particular, in order to defend the proposition that all things are caused. Perhaps he was pandering to religious ideas about "A Universal Consciousness" (Deity) directing all things, or committing them to an intentional supernatural design.

[GB: Of course, you are right that one doesn’t need omniscience to defend causality. Nonetheless, with their assumption of finite causality the classical mechanists hubristically stumbled into that claim of omniscience. Classical determinism was a clear outgrowth of classical mechanism, as exhibited so well by Laplace’s Demon. I don’t think there was any more religious pandering involved than in Newton’s original formulation. With mathematics pervasive in mechanics, it was necessary to deal with a finite number of variables. Any thought of infinite universal causality in theory (if there indeed was one) naturally would have given way to finite universal causality in practice. Laplace was no dummy, so I doubt that infinite universal causality had occurred to anyone at that point. I suspect that he was simply producing the logical conclusion that classical mechanics offered.]

BW: It's also true that Descartes resorted to "substance dualism" to explain (or discard) human thought and free will as some kind of "mental substance", distinct from material, "corporeal substance." It's not a bad guess, but it's purely a convenient post-hoc exception to determinism.

TSW: "... Engrossed in their static models, mechanists tended to overemphasize things rather than processes."

[GB: Thanks for the reference to Descartes’ objectification of motion. Do you have the exact Volume and page number from which I could quote? Your mention shows that the tendency to objectify motion was a characteristic of mechanics from the beginning. Lavoisier did it with his “caloric fluid” to explain heat motion, and both Lavoisier and Einstein did it with the corpuscular theory to explain light motion. It continues for most of us when we objectify time. Sorry, free will neither exists nor occurs, but it is interesting that someone tried to objectify it. The mistaken objectification of the mind I can understand. It is an easy mistake to make. One can see the brain, which contains “substance,” but one cannot see the mind, which is simply the motions of the matter within the brain.]

BW: I don't see anything "static" about determinism or mechanism. Both of them admit, or even require, process motions in nature or in thought. Granted, the *impression* that mystics got from mechanists was of a perpetual-motion clockwork, which they found unsavory and a frivolous account of consciousness, purpose, and creativity.

 [GB: In a sense, you are right that both determinism and mechanism are about matter in motion. Determinism and mechanism, however, have always lived in an antagonistic world that has mightily resisted the implications. Most of us, having been born into indeterminism, unavoidably bring opposing views to the scientific table. The tendency to believe in motionless matter and/or matterless motion is always there, as you yourself demonstrate later in this dialogue.]

TSW: "In keeping with their static, finite nature and simplicity, these models did not allow for evolution."

BW: I'll grant that scientific inquiry DID get bogged down in mathematical models by mechanism. However, I don't think either of them were static, rigid, nor even finite. I also think the term "evolution" needs an adjective, since Lamarckian evolution is quite distinct from Darwinian evolution.

[GB: Sorry, but I see the stasis and finity ideas as obvious. Mechanism began with Newton in 1787, but evolution was not accepted until Darwin in 1859. The stasis and finitude were based on religion, which saw all microcosms as having been created in their supposed perfection, without any need or evidence for changes. That assumption, of course, is still defended widely by creationist elements in the most conservative religious sects. You are right in your implication that there were inklings of evolution prior to Darwin, with Lamarck being prominent. The ferment in geology after 1790 was particularly damaging to the creationists’ cause. Anyone interested in evolution should read Gillispie’s “Genesis and Geology”[4] for a fascinating review of that intellectual battle.

Of course, as you mention, there are all kinds of evolution and ideas about evolution. Nowadays, the creationists hardly mention geological evolution. The battlefield centers on neo-Darwinism, the accepted mechanism for biological evolution, which has become shorthand for evolution. But as I asserted in TSW, the universal mechanism of evolution is univironmental determinism, the observation that what happens to a portion of the universe is determined by the infinite matter in motion within and without. That will be a heavy load for the creationists once they find the battle against biology to be as futile as the one against geology.]

TSW: "So it was that fainthearted scientists of the late nineteenth century moved to disown matter and adopt pure motion instead."

BW: Actually, the majority of the fainthearted resorted to distinct "majesteria", conceding issues of morality and free will to the mystical domain, while retaining an empirical domain for everything else.

TSW: "Perhaps the greatest advocate of the switch was Wilhelm Ostwald, a physical chemist, who believed: "The ultimate goal of science is now presented as the task of establishing a worldview consisting purely of energy concepts, without the use of the concept of matter."

BW: First time I've ever heard the name, but Monism is barely a footnote to his declining years. Maybe you just like the nonsensical statement that some *thing* can be "universal pure energy". Kind of like the transcendental God of Hinduism. Pass the Bong.

[GB: You certainly would have known about Ostwald had you read Lenin’s “Materialism[5].” Much of that book, written in 1908, was a polemic against what Ostwald was pushing in the famous quote above. I included Ostwald to show that the counter-revolution against materialism in physics was well underway before Einstein.]   

TSW: "Today, indeterministic scientists attack inseparability, not so much by denying the concept of matter, or the concept of motion, but by denying the universality of the inseparability of the two."

BW: This is slightly at odds with your initial description of the "inseparability" being between materialism and causality.

[GB: Bill, whatever gave you that idea? If I ever wrote that, please let me know where it was. It is most certainly incorrect. Inseparability simply states, “Just as there is no motion without matter, so there is no matter without motion.” Of course, the assumptions of materialism and causality are consupponible, but I doubt that I would have used the word inseparability in describing their association.]

BW: The word "materialism" encompasses both matter and matter in motion. However, the concept "causation" is not the same as "motion", but rather a view of *events* that occur as a consequence of matter colliding with other matter that has relative motion. Matter in an inertial state requires no causation and an inertial state of motion (spin) is a persistent effect of an event that may have occurred eons earlier.

[GB: I tend to agree, although there have been many materialists who were not necessarily mechanists. Even some of today’s regressive physicists might fancy themselves materialists, all the while ascribing to Einstein’s immaterialism and the matterless motion that is the hallmark of the energy concept.]

 
TSW: "... philosophers could assume with the atomists that, although the atom itself was always in motion, whatever was inside the atom was not."

BW: Not quite correct. Atomism simply contended that atoms were indivisible. For millennia, that was an "unmitigated truth" ... until it was mitigated by the experiments of Rutherford and Fermi. That doesn't mean that there are no particles of indivisible matter, only that atoms aren't it. Technically, Quarks aren't it either. Aside from the electron, the various "flavors" are not particles, but rather sets of attributes. So far, there is no theory to explain why those attributes express in sets. Of course, I haven't yet written the Unimid Theory (UT) that explains why that is so, based on the characteristics of fundamental and identical particles of matter.

[GB: There have been many different versions of atomism. There probably are as many versions of what indivisibility means as well. I use the simplest: The ideal atom is ideally filled with ideal solid matter. It has no parts, because it is the ultimate part that forms the various parts of all other things. If it were divisible, it would form at least two parts and thus not be the ultimate fundamental particle. All such atoms are identical. Of course, all this is rank idealism, not corresponding with anything having to do with reality. Atomism contradicts the Eighth Assumption of Science, infinity (The universe is infinite, both in the microcosmic and macrocosmic directions), the Ninth Assumption of Science, relativism (All things have characteristics that make them similar to all other things as well as characteristics that make them dissimilar to all other things), and the Tenth Assumption of Science, Interconnection (All things are interconnected, that is, between any two objects exist other objects that transmit matter and motion).]

  
TSW: "If an atom had no vibratory motion, it would exhibit no temperature."

BW: I mainly agree with your distaste for the characterization of "absolute zero", but not your conclusion. As you say, heat is an effect (emission of radiation) of vibratory motion between the external electron shells of adjacent atoms. It may be true that the electrons can't be stopped, but their motion could become synchronized in such a way as to preclude further emissions of heat. Of course, "could" is a theoretical proposition, but the Bose-Einstein condensate suggests that it's possible (even though I disagree with the quantum mechanical explanation).

Note that even if the external shells of atoms could be synchronized or fused, the internal electron shells and even the nucleus would still have motion ... even if they wouldn't generate heat. So "absolute zero", if and when it is achieved, would not indicate the absence of motion.

[GB: Perfect synchronization, like “perfect” anything, is only an idealization—it cannot occur. As explained in the chapter on neomechanics, all microcosms continually absorb and emit motion to the macrocosm. As explained there, this occurs as a result of collisions between submicrocosms and supermicrocosms at the microcosm-macrocosm boundary. Thus, much of what is called “heat” or “radiation” is simply a result of the transfer of internal motion of matter within the microcosm to become external motion of matter in the macrocosm generally observed as wave motion of aether_-1. Theoretically, aether_-1 particles undergo similar processes with respect to the aether_-2 particles from which they have formed, ad infinitum.[6] We could define heat universally, with it involving all possible univironmental exchanges of motion at microcosm-macrocosm boundaries. On the other hand, we could define it specifically, as must be done in practice.]

 
TSW: "... matter could not exist at that temperature. That is, it could not exist without being in motion."

BW: I don't agree that the absence of heat, or even the absence of motion, would cause the material of the electrons, protons, and neutrons to simply "disappear". That proposition strikes me as "mystical thinking", the inverse of creating something from nothing. If you don't like something from nothing, how can you like nothing from something?

[GB: Bill, don’t get too upset. Inseparability assumes just that. There can be no matter without motion. The matter-motion inseparability only works with infinity, which always passes the buck. The “nothing” you are thinking of is a mere idealization—can’t exist, so don’t worry about it. Your problem is one only suffered by those who assume finity. We all have a choice: 1) the mystical thinking of the creation of something from nothing or 2) the existence of infinitely subdividable matter in motion everywhere. Once you make the switch to infinity, you will be free at last!]

Next: Inseparability Part 3 of 5

cotsw 008

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[1] Borchardt, Glenn, 2007, The scientific worldview: Beyond Newton and Einstein ( http://www.scientificphilosophy.com/The%20Scientific%20Worldview.html ): Lincoln, NE, iUniverse, 411 p.

[2] Ibid, Chapter 13.

[3] Borchardt, Glenn, 2004, The ten assumptions of science: Toward a new scientific worldview ( http://www.scientificphilosophy.com/assumptions.html ): Lincoln, NE, iUniverse, 125 p. [Note that the deterministic (i.e., scientific) assumptions are in bold italics. Opposing indeterministic (religious) assumptions are only in italics.]

[4] Gillispie, C.C., 1951, Genesis and geology: A study in the relations of scientific thought, natural theology, and social opinion in Great Britain, 1790-1850: New York, Harper Torchbooks, 306 p.

[5] Lenin, V.I., 1927, Materialism and empirio-criticism: Critical comments on a reactionary philosophy: New York, International, 397 p.

[6] Puetz, S.J., and Borchardt, G., 2011, Universal cycle theory: Neomechanics of the hierarchically infinite universe: Denver, Outskirts Press ( www.universalcycletheory.com ), 626 p.

Critique of "The Scientific Worldview": Part 6a The Ten Assumptions of Science: Inseparability

The infinite universe consists everywhere of infinitely dividable and integrable matter in motion. Bill resists, as a good indeterminist should.

I am ever so grateful to Bill Westmiller, whose comments are in bold and marked “BW:”. The quotes marked “TSW:” are from "The Scientific Worldview[1]" and mine are marked “[GB:”.  Despite Bill’s claim that he is in agreement with inseparability[2], the fact that his comments and my response are so lengthy (five blog entries), indicates this is really not true. Throughout, note that Bill never wavers from the mainstream assumption of microcosmic finity. This logically requires him to posit ideal solid matter as well as perfectly empty space. He needs these indeterministic assumptions to formulate a theory he is working on, which posits a finite particle and denies aether.

We are extremely fortunate to have Bill’s comments. Regressive physicists generally dismiss deterministic assumptions out of hand. Most are like the religious folks who are careful to avoid any association with atheists. Bill obviously put a lot of effort into his review of TSW. He has given us the opportunity to view opposing assumptions side-by-side. A living, breathing advocate is preferable to the possible straw men and cherry picking that could pop up in the process of writing a book. Throughout these discussions, I don’t expect Bill to suddenly morph into a univironmental determinist[3] for two reasons: First, he did the entire review before my input, and second, he has been an indeterminist his entire life. Once on the finite track, it is hard to get off, as I explained in my blog on “Sidetracking the Big Bang Theory” and demonstrated in my extended debate with Bill on freewill. One characteristic of indeterminists is that they are not particularly bothered by contradictions. As you will see in the discussions below, Bill is no exception. On the other hand, Bill caught me in one, which surely will be removed from the 2^nd edition. See if you can find it before he points it out. There will be a quiz!  

BW: I'll start and end with the same statement: In general, there's very little to disagree with in this chapter (in spite of my prolific notes on syntax and terminology). At worst, we disagree on whether motion "creates" matter or that matter "requires" motion for its existence.

TSW: "Just as there is no motion without matter, so there is no matter without motion."

BW: I agree with the first clause but dispute the second. I think it conceivable to have a universe with static matter and no motion, but it wouldn't be the one we live in. In fact, it couldn't have any features whatever, let alone any conscious beings. So, I concur with the sentiment, but not the phrasing. More on my dispute with the Hegel proposition below.

[GB: Bill, I am glad that you finally are beginning to realize that matter without motion is only a pipe dream despite your contradictory statement that “I think it conceivable to have a universe with static matter and no motion.” No one has ever found matter without motion in all the centuries we have been studying it. Perhaps your reluctance is a reflection of your belief in microcosmic finity, which requires the atomistic belief in “solid matter.” Like you, some atomists thought that the universe ultimately consisted of identical particles containing solid matter. They were a bit more advanced, however, in that they considered these atoms to be in motion, at least partially negating your objection. Of course, a universe with identical atoms wouldn’t work either, because there would be no reason for them to join together, forming the complexes we know as matter.]

TSW: "How many people really understand that the conceptual unification that Einstein was trying to achieve is, in the end, impossible? ... His belief in finity led to the conceptual and mathematical closure that gave him the equation."

BW: I'm reluctant to give Einstein credit for a concept of energy that "was to guarantee physical inseparability for all time." It was Newton who described energy as the product of mass in motion (½mv²). All Einstein did was substitute c² for v² and drop the conversion factor. There's a very interesting background story to *why* he did that, but the effect was to make mass a *variable* and velocity finite ... *rather than* relative. It seems to me logically incoherent to call such a theory "Relativity". It is correct to say he added "finity" to the velocity, but in so doing, he added *infinity* to mass.

TSW: "... neither matter nor motion should be considered more important than the other ..."

BW: I understand your point that both are necessary, but either formula makes it clear that the quantity of motion is the square greater influence than the quantity of matter in properly calculating kinetic energy. Otherwise, it would just be E=mv.

[GB: Bill, interesting point, but I believe we should not be so literal when using these abstractions. The main idea here is that, without matter, motion contributes nothing to energy. Choosing between matter and motion is like choosing between width and length in calculating the area of a rectangle. Although the width and length could be vastly different, both are equally important. You can’t have one without the other.]

TSW: "What gives an object its materiality is, first, its consisting of other objects in motion, and second, its existing among other objects in motion."

BW: Hegel is just speculating. Matter isn't "given" substance, it IS substance ... whether moving or not, relatively or objectively. Its existence is not dependent upon "containing" other forms of matter in motion, nor the existence of any other form of matter being in motion. Hegel is trying to objectify motion, which you rightly condemn. I might be able to understand his reductionist presumption (from the evidence at hand), but the remainder is a meaningless self-referential definition: matter gets its substance from matter and other matter, otherwise "it" wouldn't have matter or be matter. Silly.

[GB: Disagree, of course. I don’t see an objectification of motion in that statement. I don’t know where Hegel said that “matter was given substance,” and would not agree with it in any case—smacks of some kind of creationist atomism. Matter always contains other matter, not some magical “substance.” There is no such thing as matter per se. Matter is an abstraction for all things. Each of those things must contain other things in motion and exist among other things in motion. Believers in finity cannot understand this, of course. Without the Eighth Assumption of Science, infinity (The universe is infinite, both in the microcosmic and macrocosmic directions), one needs to hypothesize solid matter to provide the substance. Because the universe cannot produce empty space or solid matter, neither will ever be found and no regressive physicist will be able to define matter properly.]  

BW: I realize that you like Hegel's micro and macro-cosmic infinity, but I don't think they're logically sound. He talks about "pure matter", as though other forms were "impure". He says that all matter has charge: "the essence of matter is attraction and repulsion", but I've never heard of negative gravity. He asserts that matter is both divisible and continuous, and at the same time neither of the two. Oddly, these statements appear in a book titled "Science of Logic", when they are anything but logical.

[GB: I am not familiar with “Hegel’s micro and macro-cosmic infinity.” Do you have a reference? Actually, aside from the dictum I use as the Fourth Assumption of Science, I don’t agree with most of Hegel’s stuff—he was a dualist, after all. You are right that the use of “pure” and “impure” implies microcosmic finity, not microcosmic infinity, despite whatever else he says. I also agree with you that all matter does not have charge. If there is an essence to matter, it is not attraction and repulsion, but convergence and divergence (Sixth Assumption of Science). I especially did not like his habit of attributing opposing properties at the same time. That’s why I included The Ninth Assumption of Science, relativism (All things have characteristics that make them similar to all other things as well as characteristics that make them dissimilar to all other things). As you will see, his “divisible and continuous” observation is well handled by the Tenth Assumption of Science, Interconnection (All things are interconnected, that is, between any two objects exist other objects that transmit matter and motion).]

TSW: "... motion always refers to an object that is moving relative to other objects ..."

BW: Almost always. Relativity is correct for all translational motion, but not for spin. Rotational motion is relative to the center of mass, not another object. Once spin is imparted, it is an inertial state of motion.

[GB: Sorry Bill, but your analysis has a macrocosmic error. Each submicrocosm within the microcosm of the rotating body moves with respect to all other submicrocosms within. In addition, each of these submicrocosms is moving with respect to each of the supermicrocosms without. Whether the motion is inertial or accelerated makes no difference. The fact that one may not be able to measure any of this has nothing to do with it.]

BW: For example, you're in your space ship, in an inert state, and an irregular object passes you. Relative to your position, you detect motion and can quantify it. You accelerate and match the object's motion. Now, relative to you, it has no motion. Both you and the object are in the same inertial frame. However, if the object is spinning, you cannot move your ship to an inert position that creates the appearance of a non-spinning object. That requires constant acceleration to maintain an orbit. There is no internal frame of reference for the observer, even though the spin itself is an inertial state.

[GB: It actually is impossible for the space ship and the irregular object to be absolutely motionless with respect to each other. For instance, both have tiny motions indicative of the vibrations we measure as temperature in addition to the tendency to rotate in response to irregularities in the macrocosm. This nicely illustrates why there are no perfectly inertial frames. The fact that you cannot establish an inertial frame for the spin of the object has nothing to do with whether the object is in motion or not. Your approach, operationalism, is a form of positivism that defines scientific concepts in terms of the operations used to determine or prove them. Einstein was particularly plagued with this form of solipsistic indeterminism, being fixated on frames and measurement. One example is his mysterious denial of simultaneity. Most anyone with any sense knows that there are many events occurring at exactly the same time in the universe, even though we cannot prove that without making fallible measurements involving the velocity of light.]

Next: Inseparability Part 2 of 5

cotsw 007

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[1] Borchardt, Glenn, 2007, 2007, The scientific worldview: Beyond Newton and Einstein ( http://www.scientificphilosophy.com/The%20Scientific%20Worldview.html ): Lincoln, NE, iUniverse, 411 p.

[2] The scientific assumptions mentioned above were discussed in Chapter 3 of TSW and in:

Borchardt, Glenn, 2004, The ten assumptions of science: Toward a new scientific worldview: Lincoln, NE, iUniverse, 125 p. (http://www.scientificphilosophy.com/assumptions.html )

[3] Univironmental determinism, the observation that what happens to a portion of the universe is determined by the infinite matter within and without, was presented as the universal mechanism of evolution in TSW (footnote 1 above).