Critique of "The Scientific Worldview": Part 11c The Ten Assumptions of Science: Relativism

The infinite universe produces no identities except in the minds of idealists. Do not worry. This blog has little to do with relativity.

I am ever so grateful to Bill Westmiller, whose comments are marked "BW: ". The quotes marked TSW are from "The Scientific Worldview[1]" and my comments are marked "[GB: ".

TSW: Ninth Assumption of Science, relativism (Part 3 of 3)

“All things have characteristics that make them similar to all other things as well as characteristics that make them dissimilar to all other things.”

TSW:  "Disparity is the result of divergence, analogy the result of convergence."

BW: Odd contrast, since disparity is a fact in reality, whereas analogy is a mental process. There's certainly plenty of divergence in evolution, but very little convergence. Communication facilitates a convergence of knowledge and understanding, but only rarely a new divergence. Dialectics are useful tools for resolving conflicting ideas, but nature doesn't do dialectics.

[GB: Of course, analogy and disparity are both mental processes. So analogy occurs when things are brought together and are considered to be similar and disparity occurs when things are brought apart and are considered to be dissimilar. Sorry, but evolution involves equal amounts of divergence and convergence. You are right that communication is a convergence (how could it be otherwise). As I have said before, it is definitely not true that nature doesn't do dialectics. In the infinite universe, things are always moving together or apart—pretty simple.]

TSW:  "Although the classification process is a result of mental activity, it reflects the actual differentiation and integration of matter, as well."

BW: To the degree that it doesn't reflect reality, it is demonstrably false.

[GB: Of course.]

TSW:  "... The third level is an attempt to compare the measurements themselves in an objective way."

BW: Pleased to see your commentary "evolving" to an appreciation of objectivity. It should be one of the primary "assumptions" of science, which is always seeking objective truths about reality, rather than vague, whimsical, arbitrary, or subjective impressions.

TSW:  "... mathematize the comparison ..."

BW: I don't think math is the Sine Qua Non of objectivity. Yes, quantitative distinctions are important, but not at the expense of qualitative features. Mathematics is fine when it uses numbers, but it frequently adopts symbols to represent Westmiller Things, without defining them. For example, the "v" of velocity doesn't indicate whether the attribute is relative (translational) or objective (rotational). The frame of reference is missing and frequently confused. There are still many physicists who use "pure energy" terminology, as though it were disconnected from mass and velocity.

[GB: Sorry, but most physicists would disagree with you about the objectivity of math. What math and objectivity attempt to do is to force us into agreement about reality. Indeterminists need a “frame of reference” only because they are solipsists who have problems viewing the macrocosm as independent from themselves. You are right, of course, that the term “energy” is commonly disconnected from matter and motion.] 

TSW:  "Pi, for example, can be calculated at least a million more decimal places than it can be measured. The diameter and circumference of a real circle fluctuates over time; only the imagined, 'ideal' circle does not."

BW: I think Pi is a good argument against the existence of "real circles", or even "ideal" ones. I won't elaborate.

Your SIMAN coefficient sounds useful for some applications, but not for comparing Westmiller Things. What is the similarity index between gravity and acceleration? How "equivalent" are they?

[GB: Gravitation and acceleration are not “things”. They are motions. I suppose we could calculate SIMAN coefficients for comparing motions as well as things. We do this all the time when we say, for example, that the velocity of a particle is 99% the velocity of light (SIMAN coefficient = 0.99). The acceleration of Earth’s gravity is 9.8 m/s², while the acceleration of a rocket must be greater than that to achieve liftoff. The rule for similarity analysis states that all SIMAN coefficients must be less than 1.00, so we would use the rocket acceleration as the divisor when making the comparison.]

TSW:  David Bohm: "Because every kind of thing is defined only through an inexhaustible set of qualities each having a certain degree of relative autonomy, such a thing can and indeed must be unique; i.e. not completely identical with any other thing in the universe, however similar the two things may be."

BW: That defeats the entire purpose of a definition, which requires differentiation and integration. See the Ayn Rand commentary linked above for the "rules of correct definition", with which I agree.

[GB: Now you are starting to catch on. Because everything in the universe has an “inexhaustible set of qualities,” we need to tame the observed microcosmic and macrocosmic infinity through “definition.” In other words, we need to call “finis” to each xyz portion of the universe to be able to speak, think, or write about it. For instance, the categories clay, silt, sand, and gravel can only be defined through the application of arbitrary particle size limits. By convention, scientists and engineers have agreed upon what those limits should be. They have not been defeated by the inexhaustible particle size continuum!

Although, characteristically long-winded and confusing, Rand[1] seems to agree with Bohm:

“…a definition implies all the characteristics of the units, since it identifies their essential, not their exhaustive, characteristics; since it designates existents, not their isolated aspects; and since it is a condensation of, not a substitute for, a wider knowledge of the existents involved.”]     

TSW:  "In regard to electrons, Bohm claimed that it is 'always possible to suppose that distinctions between electrons can arise at deeper levels.'"

BW: It is always possible that there are pigs that fly. If so, the definition of "pig" (or "electron") will remain the same, but we will have a new identity for a different animal, maybe called a "pyg", for flying pigs. See my prior notes about your claim that there are "three kinds of electron" (I couldn't find the Ernest Nagel citation anywhere on the net).

BTW: In UT [Bill’s Unimid Theory], electrons do have a slightly different shape, depending on their reference orbital shell or transmission context. But, they're all the same mass and configuration (of Unimids).

[GB: The three types of electrons quote was from Weisskopf (1979)[2]. BTW: In one of my speculations, I once calculated that an electron might contain 10²⁰ aether_-1  particles. Good luck trying to get two of those puppies to have the exact same number of aether_-1 particles. The Nagel quotes were from the 1961 edition of his book.[3] ]

TSW:  "In brief, parity implied that atomic nuclei oriented in a particular direction would emit beta particles with the same intensity as they would when oriented in the opposite direction. Experiments finally showed that emission was not identical in both directions."

BW: Actually, it wasn't "intensity", but frequency. It didn't indicate that beta particles violated parity, but rather that neutrinos had two distinct spin configurations, prompting one to be labeled an "anti-neutrino". I hate the prefix, which implies that the object is the opposite of a neutrino, when it is just a "left-neutrino", which could be called a "leutrino", as distinct from a "reutrino".
http://hyperphysics.phy-astr.gsu.edu/hbase/quantum/parity.html#c2

TSW:  "As a result, the comparisons that we make in science and in everyday life have a single criterion for validity: usefulness."

BW: Material efficacy is just a consequence of truth. It may be "useful" to imagine a Loving God, or even believe in one, but that doesn't make the conception valid.

[GB: There are various definitions of the word “valid.” Here, a valid comparison merely has to be convincing, it does not have to be true. People make valid comparisons between their various gods all the time. They must find that useful, or else they would not do it.]

BW: Finally, it's very strange that you would not discuss Einstein's Theories of Relativity in a chapter titled "Relativism". It certainly seems "relevant" to "relativism". Maybe I'll find something later in the book.

[GB: Those are different subjects. In any case, Einstein was more an absolutist than he was a relativist. How else could one imagine that the velocity of light was absolutely constant?]

Next: Interconnection

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[1] http://aynrandlexicon.com/lexicon/definitions.html

[2] Weisskopf, V.F., 1979, Contemporary frontiers in physics: Science, v. 203, p. 240-244.

[3] Nagel, Ernest, 1961, The structure of science: New York, Harcourt Brace and World, 618 p.

Critique of "The Scientific Worldview": Part 11b The Ten Assumptions of Science: Relativism

Bill throws in a bit of absolutism to stir the pot and keep his own assumptions consupponible. Reasoning by analogy and disparity.

I am ever so grateful to Bill Westmiller, whose comments are marked "BW: ". The quotes marked TSW are from "The Scientific Worldview[1]" and my comments are marked "[GB: ".

TSW: Ninth Assumption of Science, relativism (Part 2 of 3)

“All things have characteristics that make them similar to all other things as well as characteristics that make them dissimilar to all other things.”

TSW:  "In short, the concept of a general horse is an abstraction, an idealization we use to give a class a name, to think about it, and to communicate our thoughts to others."

BW: Correct, but ask yourself what that concept must be abstracted FROM, in order to be valid. Reality. In other words, it isn't a random "idealization" of reality,  but rather a set of attributes *extracted* from reality that allow us to talk about Borchardt Things and Westmiller Things. Are some attributes "ignored"? Of course. It would be foolish to say that a "horse" is an object with mass, or even to say that it is a living thing ... since every Borchardt Thing has mass and a dead horse is just one type of horse. A proper definition doesn't alter reality, it just categorizes essential attributes.

http://aynrandlexicon.com/lexicon/definitions.html

[GB: You are correct in that abstractions are not random. Abstractions nevertheless are idealizations. Like you said, we chose the attributes most important for our purpose. While classifications usually do not alter the microcosms they describe, many are as notable for the attributes they leave out as for the attributes they leave in.]

TSW:  "Mental activity itself involves elements of both relativism and absolutism."

BW: In which case, you either have to be opposed to mental activity, or abandon your characterizations of relativism or absolutism as incompatible opposites. Some Westmiller Things are relative, others are absolute. It seems that you're committing all Borchardt Things to unthinkable solipsism.

[GB: After writing the sentence you quoted, I went on to explain that although all microcosms have infinite characteristics that place them on a similarity-dissimilarity continuum per relativism, we often find it necessary to use absolutist terms. For instance, like other animals we need to decide what is “food” and what is “non-food.” And, just to walk through a doorway, we need to think of the adjoining wall as “solid matter” and the doorway as “empty space,” even though neither is true in an absolute sense. Equalities and inequalities in math serve the same purpose. Like many folks, what you seem to have missed is the distinction between ideality and reality. We do not need to believe that there really are absolutes such as equalities or “perfectly solid matter” and “perfectly empty space.” So sorry that you must believe that “some Westmiller Things are relative, others are absolute.” I can see why that is necessary for you. Without that tiny bit of absolutism, you could not be serious about proposing yet another Finite Particle Theory. At least, your approach appears consupponible with your other marginally indeterministic interpretations of "The Ten Assumptions of Science":

1.     Early on, you mentioned that you were “95% in agreement with the ten assumptions”.

2.     You then professed a belief in causality (that there are material causes for all effects), but qualified that with an exception consupponible with your belief in free will.

3.     You professed a belief in inseparability (Just as there is no motion without matter, so there is no matter without motion), but attempted to qualify it by imagining the insides of things to be motionless or that an object in rotation without translation could be considered 
  motionless with respect to other things.

4.     You professed a belief in macrocosmic infinity, but not in microcosmic infinity.

5.     Now you profess a belief that relativism applies most of the time but that absolutism applies some of the time.

I suspect that future complaints will take the same tack: sneaking a little indeterminism into your assumptions whenever you like. I imagine you will really bust something critical when you confront the chapter on “The Myth of Exceptionalism.” While your approach is a little bit like being “95% pregnant” or “half-way to crazy town”, I suspect that many readers started out the same way. You certainly are not the only “materialist” who still believes in free will. I guess even dialectical materialists such as Friedrich Engels did not think there could be a revolution without it.

At first, when you said you were 95% in agreement with "The Ten Assumptions of Science," I could not imagine how that could be. Disagreement with one of them would amount to 90% agreement. As it turns out, you have tiny exceptions to every one of them. I should have realized that the transition from indeterminism to determinism proceeds in a series of such small steps. You are simply further along than many folks are.

I also could not understand your occasional claim that I was being solipsistic by hypothesizing things for which there is little or no evidence. I did not realize how closely you adhered to the positivist credo: “If I cannot see, smell, touch, hear, or taste something, it does not exist.” Or, to the operationalist credo: “If I cannot measure it, it does not exist.” On the contrary, it is the prevalence of such self-centered views that makes regressive physics so solipsistic. It was just such solipsism as its positivist variant that led Einstein to hypothesize “immaterial fields” that were amenable to mathematical treatment, but beyond his imagination. It was just such solipsism as its operationalist variant that led him to his equally outrageous denial of simultaneity. Just because it takes us eight minutes to provide confirmation does not mean the Sun and Earth do not exist at the same time.]

TSW:  "Obviously, no agreement can be reached about similarity-dissimilarity unless the observers agree to compare the same characteristics. Until this is accomplished for a finite set of measurable characteristics, a classification or comparison must remain subjective rather than objective."

BW: Correct, but missing the central point. It isn't that the observers agree, but that the essential characteristics being considered are consistent with reality. That is what makes a comparison "objective": any person can *identify* a horse (or swan), irrespective of its color or any other incidental characteristics. A rose by any other name...

[GB: Sorry, but the “consistency with reality” is not the problem. We may agree that two microcosms each have an infinite number of characteristics “consistent with reality,” but because no two of those characteristics are identical, we might disagree on which ones are similar and which ones are dissimilar. This is a major contention in taxonomy and classifications of every type.[1] It happens to me all the time. When I mention that two people are similar, while my wife invariably says they are not. We are each simply using different criteria.]

TSW:  "An analogy, like an assumption, must lead to understanding and accurate prediction or it will be discarded as useless."

BW: Your discussion of analogies is good, but it stretches the meaning. An analogy is a reference to the in-kind Westmiller Things about objects, not a reference to the Borchardt Things themselves. To analogize human walking to horse walking is a statement about the characteristics of walking, not about the definition of humans or horses.

[GB: Thanks, but I do not understand what you are getting at. Are you trying to say that one of the characteristics of humans and horses is not walking? Also, I do not understand your reference to “in-kind” and “themselves”.

TSW:  "Humans, for example, were not considered similar to other animals until the scientific and commercial advantages of the analogy outweighed the religious objections."

BW: I don't think that's true. Nearly all mystics considered humans to be animals ... with a soul. Many religious doctrines even assert that many or all "lower animals" also have souls. In ancient Hebrew, the word for "spirit" and "breath" are identical; both are invisible and one is intimately connected with living things (including plants). So, a cynical reading of the bible considers "soul" nothing more than a typographical error.

[GB: Well, I think that is debatable. Traditionally, humans were not considered to be animals, having been formed instead in the image of their imaginary friend. There commonly were no rules against killing animals, while the killing of certain humans was considered immoral, to say the least. You are right that ascribing “souls” to anything that moved was part of the traditional approach to the motion of matter. As you know, there still are many folks who do not believe that time is motion or who believe that souls are matterless motion. You can be as cynical as you want, but I do not think many believers consider their imagined “soul” to be a typo.]

Next: Relativism (Part 3 of 3)

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[1] Borchardt, Glenn, 1974, The SIMAN coefficient for similarity analysis: Bulletin of the Classification Society, v. 3, p. 2-8.

Critique of "The Scientific Worldview": Part 11a The Ten Assumptions of Science: Relativism

Bill throws in a bit of absolutism to stir the pot and keep his own assumptions consupponible.

I am ever so grateful to Bill Westmiller, whose comments are marked "BW: ". The quotes marked TSW are from "The Scientific Worldview[1]" and my comments are marked "[GB: ".

TSW: Ninth Assumption of Science, relativism (Part 1 of 3)

“All things have characteristics that make them similar to all other things as well as characteristics that make them dissimilar to all other things.”

BW: ... an assumption depending on the definition of "things". I know a lot of dictionaries simply define "thing" as any material object, but I prefer the broader definition from Merriam-Webster, which encompasses events, acts, situations, and qualities as "things":

http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/thing

For clarity, I'll assume (you don't say) that your "things" are only "material objects", in contrast with my "things" as any object or condition amenable to abstraction. This presumptive "attitude" is just "my thing".

[GB: Right. For the univironmental determinist, “things” always have xyz dimensions and location with respect to other things. True to the indeterministic approach of Merriam-Webster and the religious culture in general, your definition of “thing” objectifies motions (events and acts) in the same way Einstein did in his most important philosophical error.[1]]

BW: So ... it is true that all *material objects* are similar to all other things that have matter. It is also true that all material objects have position, motion, and environments that are dissimilar from all other material objects. Therefore, for Borchardt Things, your statement is true.

[GB: Glad to see that you agree.]

BW: However, for Westmiller Things, it isn't necessarily true. Gravity is not "similar to" any other things. Mass in any one thing is not "dissimilar" to mass in all other things. Electrons have characteristics that are not "dissimilar" to other electrons, although electrons are "dissimilar" to all things that are not electrons.

[GB: Sorry, Bill, but gravity is not a thing. It is a motion. If you think it is a thing, please give me some of it so I can use it to hammer my next nail without exerting any effort. Similarly, mass is not a thing. Mass is a measurement of a thing’s resistance to acceleration. As in the case of snowflakes, which we can see, we may assume that no two electrons, which we cannot see, are identical. Like other idealists, you have only imagined them to be so. Whenever we compare any two snowflakes in detail, we find that they have dissimilarities as well as similarities. If we could do that for electrons, we would get a similar result. When the dissimilarities among microcosms become great enough, we consider them to be members of a different class. The transition from one class to another is never as distinct as indeterminists imagine. That is the essence of relativism. There are always some similarities between microcosms.]

TSW:  "The Law of Identity or Equality, A = A, that is, every concept is equal to itself."

BW: That's not the usual meaning. It isn't that concepts are equal, but that a "thing" is what it is. It can't be an Apple and a Non-Apple at the same time. This is a statement about nature, dictated by logic, not consciousness. Granted, we use concepts to refer to "things", but that just requires that our definitions of terms be rational and consistent with reality. E.g.: You can't have nothing that is something.

[GB: Remember that the quote above was written by an absolutist. The other end of that continuum is the Law of Inequality, A / A. The reality is, as in the empty space-solid matter idealization, always in between. Because all matter is always in motion, no single thing is equal to itself for even a microsecond. As you recognize, the apple that you speak of will not always remain an apple. Eventually it will rot, becoming a “non-apple” part of the soil that engulfed it. Absolutists, such as yourself, tend to think of things as being static. That kind of “reality” does not and cannot exist.]

TSW:  "There are no strict identities because all matter is in constant motion; no thing can be what it was just a moment before."

BW: There's a difference between identity and position. A Borchardt Thing doesn't cease to be what it is, simply because it's position, relative to other things, has changed. Since all translational motion is relative, we can't even say that a thing has moved. Maybe it's just the other things that are moving. Your formulation suggests that a Borchardt Thing becomes *something else*, or nothing else, because other things are moving.

[GB: Bill, look at it this way: All microcosms (Borchardt Things, as you say) are composed of submicrocosms and exist in a sea of supermicrocosms, all of which are in motion. There is a continuous exchange of matter and the motion of matter between the microcosm and its macrocosm. Thus, a person, for example, continually breathes in and out, exchanging carbon dioxide for oxygen, losing hair, and gaining or losing weight with every microsecond. This occurs even for operationalists who think that they are not moving with respect to anything else just because they cannot measure it.]

BW: IF you're considering the Westmiller Thing called "motion" to be a *characteristic* of the Borchardt Thing called "object", then nothing ever has any identity at all. One second, an Apple is an Apple, but the next millisecond (due to the rotation of the earth) it is something else. That's a VERY strange way to view Borchardt Things.

[GB: Huh? Motion is not a thing.]

TSW:  "Absolutism is consupponible with certainty and that bulwark of classical mechanism, the notion of finite universal causality."

BW: I understand your intent, but I think you're just defining terms in such a way as to make them appear to be logically coherent (consupponible). For example, it isn't "absolutism" to assert that a Borchardt Thing retains its identity, irrespective of its relative motion. It might be "absolutism" to say that an Apple is forever an Apple, even after it rots and disintegrates into a pile of chemical compounds.

[GB: Right. I use no definitions or assumptions that are not consupponible. And, as I just explained, it is indeed “absolutism” to assert an identity for a real object at any time. Such claims are of a piece with Plato’s ideal objects, which could exist nowhere except in his head. The removal of every little bit of absolutism is a critical component of univironmental determinism and its reduction, neomechanics. When you get to neomechanics, you will see that I was careful not to draw the abstract microcosms as spheres. The irregularities in a microcosmic boundary imply that the microcosm has parts, submicrocosms capable of semi-independent motion, reflecting the observation that no microcosm retains perfect identity for even a nanosecond. The perfect identities of the absolutist are not necessary for an apple to be good enough to be called an apple for a long time.]

TSW:  "Only if an object could be described completely by a finite number of unchanging characteristics could it be absolutely identical to another object with the same description."

BW: The logically coherent interpretation of this sentence is that no Borchardt Thing can ever be described. Nothing has any identity unless every Westmiller Thing about it remains static. The conclusion has to be that we can never know anything about reality, even if what we assert is an unmitigated truth. If that's the case, why even bother to make the effort of putting one word after another in an effort to describe reality, or relativity, or infinity?

[GB: Now, now, Bill, do not get discouraged. I am sorry that the infinite universe did not turn out as perfect or absolute as you had hoped. Remember the Third Assumption of Science, uncertainty, (It is impossible to know everything about anything, but it is possible to know more about anything.) We can make wonderful descriptions about things in spite of those things having infinite qualities and existing in an infinite macrocosm. Many of these descriptions will even hold up long enough to be published. Those of us who have examined the real world continually find endless detail. The mathematically inclined and others who think they have discovered an identity invariably have not done their homework. Upon closer examination, each portion of the universe reveals its infinite variety.]

Next: Relativism (Part 2 of 3)

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[1] Borchardt, Glenn, 2011, Einstein's most important philosophical error, in Proceedings of the Natural Philosophy Alliance, 18th Conference of the NPA, 6-9 July, 2011 ( http://www.worldsci.org/pdf/abstracts/abstracts_5991.pdf ), College Park, MD, Natural Philosophy Alliance, Mt. Airy, MD, p. 64-68.

Critique of "The Scientific Worldview": Part 10b The Ten Assumptions of Science: Infinity

Bill confronts his nemesis: microcosmic infinity. Why we need to understand fundamental assumptions to confront regressive physics.

I am ever so grateful to Bill Westmiller, whose comments are marked "BW: ". The quotes marked TSW are from "The Scientific Worldview[1]" and my comments are marked "[GB: ".

TSW: Eighth Assumption: Infinity (Part 2 of 2)

“The universe is infinite, both in the microcosmic and macrocosmic directions."

TSW:  "For example, a million atoms of gold did not weigh the same as a million atoms of silver. How could the atom be the ultimate particle if different atoms had different masses?"

BW: Seriously? Nobody ever imagined, much less suggested, that every atom had the same weight. It was the difference in their weight (and properties) that led Mendeleev to create the periodic table.

[GB: Wrong. The essence of atomism, the Finite Particle Theory of the Greeks, was exactly as I implied. As originally idealized, matter consisted of atoms, round little identical indivisible balls of solid matter. Some folks still hold to that belief, although they have abandoned the atom as a misnomer, hypothesizing that the true “atom” is a much smaller constituent.^[1]]

TSW:  "The electron has been succeeded by the quark as the smallest subatomic particle."

BW: A quark isn't a particle, it's a set of attributes (mass, charge, spin) which are expressed in different configurations of bosons.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:Standard_Model_of_Elementary_Particles.svg

That suggests that there *are* smaller particles that dictate those attributes and their combinations. I don't deny that there is at least one additional incremental step in the microcosm: that's what the Unimid Theory is all about. But, I can only claim that Unimids [Bill’s finite particles] *need not be* divisible and offer my logical arguments on the evidence.

[GB: Sorry Bill, but a “set of attributes” cannot be a particle. What you mean is that there are many different kinds of quarks, with each type having different attributes. Atomic particles are similar—we call them elements. You can be as “logical” as you want with Finite Particle Theory, but you won’t get anywhere without first assuming microcosmic finity. Just prey that no one busts your Unimid particle before you finish the theory!]

TSW:  "One scientist felt sure that 'matter is not infinitely divisible,' while another reiterated that 'no ‘ultimate’ individual or partless particle is known to science.'

BW: Both were correct, based on the available evidence. Democritus was right for 2,200+ years ... until new evidence mitigated that truth. The other statement will also be true, until UT is validated by evidence.

[GB: Good luck with that.]

TSW:  "... there are now at least three different kinds of electrons, some of which emit neutrinos."

BW: My Kindle version doesn't have footnotes, so I have no idea what you're talking about. There is only one "kind" of electron. There are three types, or "flavors", of neutrinos (which have no charge), but their names do not imply that they are the same as electrons (which have charge): electron neutrinos, muon neutrinos and tau neutrinos. Each of them is a distinct particle, even if they're in the same class.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Neutrino

[GB: That reference is: Weisskopf, V.F., 1979, Contemporary frontiers in physics: Science, v. 203, p. 240-244. Your neutrino example furnishes the same point: the splitting goes on and on. And, like all microcosms, no two particles, even those within a particular class are identical. BTW: My recent speculation concerning electrons indicates that each has about 10²⁰ aether particles—not much chance for any two of them being identical.]

TSW:  "The indeterministic notion of the ultimate particle with no thing (e.g., nothing) inside it is of a sort with the indeterministic notion of a universe with no thing (e.g., nothing) outside it."

BW: An amusing semantic twist, but invalid. An ultimate particle would be solid mass, not empty. To assert that it doesn't have constituent parts (no smaller things) is not saying it contains nothing. It isn't "of a sort" with the proposition of an eternal nothingness (void) *outside* of the known cosmos.

[GB: Imagine what you will. Steve and I speculated that our aether progression would become increasingly dense, but we never assumed that it could become infinitely dense.]

TSW:  "The philosophical purpose of finity, whether it be construed as microscopic, macroscopic, or both, is at some point to call a halt to materialism."

BW: A microcosmic fundamental particle IS matter, not immaterial. Of course, it can always be argued that the Unimid is not "fundamental", but that's a different question.

[GB: Remember that materialism assumes that the universe consists of matter in motion. Once you claim that the insides of a microcosm have matter that is not in motion (as you have alluded to before) you have left materialism behind. Good luck with that!] 

TSW:  Lakatos: "As the universe is infinitely varied, it is very likely that only statements of infinite length can be true."

BW: ... because Imre Lakatos says it, or because Lakatos was a dialectical materialist?

[GB: …because the statement is close to being true. However, per causality, I would have omitted the words “it is very likely that.” ]

BW: In essence, he's just restating Karl Popper's characterization of the "uncertainty" of inductive reasoning. What Popper says about induction is correct, but irrelevant, simply because he offers a standard of impossible human omniscience, rather than "unmitigated truth".

[GB: With both Lakatos and Popper we are seeing the intellectual movement toward the correct understanding of the relation between causality and uncertainty. That’s why Popper is famous for his view that theories can never be proven. In tune with infinity, they can only be supported or falsified. As you can see, I use the same approach with fundamental assumptions. And, as you have shown throughout this discussion, one can never completely prove fundamental assumptions beyond an indeterminist’s doubt. Ultimately, one can only assume them.]

TSW:  "Thus, the infinite hotel with the infinite number of rooms can always accommodate an infinite number of guests."

BW: It's a funny story, which ignores the fact there is no room available for the first guest, since there are no predecessors.

[GB: What? There are an infinite number of rooms. Why wouldn’t there be room for one guest?]

TSW:  Planck: "... calculation shows that an infinitely long time passes ..."

BW: An artificial construct, like Zeno's Paradox: taking half-the-remainder steps toward the wall never gets you to the wall. Whenever a mathematical construct "goes to infinity", it probably has no correlation with reality. You discard the "paradoxes", because they "assume reversibility" in an artificially isolated system. I don't think that's true or relevant: it's just an illogic word game, expressed in mathematical terminology. But, I do like your rebuttal to the Planck assertion of "within-class" infinity.

BTW: Planck was also wrong about his "quanta" being discrete particles of light. It's just a conversion factor. Ask if you want an explanation.

TSW:  Paul Davies: "The infinities that occur in QED (quantum electrodynamics) are clearly symptomatic of some profound shortcomings in our understanding of physics."

BW: He's right: any time a theoretical mathematical description "goes to infinity", it is probably false. But that's a conclusion at odds with your observation:

TSW:  "We invariably give up contact with the real world whenever we use mathematical axioms that 'somehow avoid the concept of infinity."

BW: On the contrary, It is THAT the mathematical axioms DO go to infinity that makes them invalid. It's a good argument *against* infinities in math, not *for* infinity in nature.

[GB: That is exactly what we expect from an infinite universe. Even math is telling us that the universe is infinite. Only those who assume finity consider the resulting axioms to be invalid.]

TSW:  "This model, unfortunately of a piece with mere enumeration, is nonetheless an improvement in that it provides a three-dimensional framework for beginning a description of the real, infinite universe."

BW: Nonsense. There is no such thing as a "point", "line", or "plane" in reality: they are abstractions *from* reality, which always has three dimensions. A primary fault of the Big Bang Theory is the proposition of a "singularity", with no dimensions, as the origin of everything.

[GB: Partially disagree. Remember that the first sentence talks about “beginning a description of the real, infinite universe,” which means that it is an abstraction, as you realized. Sorry, but abstractions are not nonsense. “Fruit” is an abstraction for a class of objects. I can never eat the abstraction, but I sure can eat an apple. I agree with what you said about the Big Bang Theory.]

TSW:  Robin Collingwood: "Since modern science is now committed to a view of the physical universe as finite, certainly in space and probably in time ... the physical world as a whole must ultimately depend for its existence on something other than itself."

BW: You're comparing an obscure British professor with Aristotle??!! I discussed Aristotle's apparent "sop" to mystics earlier, explaining why it wasn't anything any mystic could love.

[GB: I don’t remember making any such comparison. Remember that Collingwood was a non-obscure English idealist. In his “An Essay on Metaphysics[2]” that I quote so much, he implied that “beyond physics” there was either something (more physics, the deterministic view) or nothing (no physics, the indeterministic view). Note how his logical progression extends to the subject at hand: determinism implies an infinite universe, while indeterminism implies a finite universe.]

TSW:  "The quest for certainty and its search for the ultimate answer to the reason for the existence of the universe periodically calls a halt to the question begging. Therein lies its fatal error."

BW: Anytime anybody pursues a "reason" for all of existence, they have committed a logical fallacy: reason is a human *product* of reality, not its creator. In the absence of a body, supporting a brain, there can be no thought, nor any motive. Reality does what it does, without the slightest "concern" about the consequences or its effect on our understanding of why it does what it does.

[GB: At last, we agree—more or less! Nonetheless, note that it is only a logical fallacy if one starts with the deterministic assumption of materialism like you and I do. Those who start with the indeterministic assumption of immaterialism generally assume that consciousness produces reality instead. Thinking that proceeds from that assumption does not amount to a logical fallacy. The logic is immaculate even though the assumption is wrong.

That is why I have emphasized "The Ten Assumptions of Science" so much. Otherwise, we would never be able to understand why folks accept all the paradoxes and contradictions of regressive physics. For instance, Einstein’s erroneous “immaterial fields” are a logical progression developed from his erroneous belief in immaterialism. For those untrained in philosophy, such as Einstein, it is not clear whether materialism or immaterialism is the correct assumption. Being agnostics unaware of their own presuppositions, they tend to waver back and forth as Einstein did, never realizing that they are “halfway to crazy town".[3]]

Next: Relativism

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[1] AbuBakr, Mohammed, 2007, The End of Pseudo-Science: Essays Refuting False Scientific Theories Taught in Schools, Colleges, and Universities, iUniverse, 86 p.

[2] Collingwood, R.G., 1940, An essay on metaphysics: Oxford, Clarendon Press, 354 p.

[3]Myers, P.Z., 2010, That's not a shoehorn, it's a sledgehammer ( http://scienceblogs.com/pharyngula/2010/06/thats_not_a_shoehorn_its_a_sle.php ).