20140101

Critique of "The Scientific Worldview": Part 9b The Ten Assumptions of Science: Irreversibility


Uniformitarianism and Bill's perfect, albeit temporary, isolation. 

I am ever so grateful to Bill Westmiller, whose comments are marked "BW: ". The quotes marked TSW are from "The Scientific Worldview[1]" and my comments are marked "[GB: ".

TSW: Seventh Assumption: Irreversibility (Part 9b)

 "All processes are irreversible."  (continued)

TSW:  "Uniformitarianism declared that the same motions were repeated over and over again."

BW: Not quite. Geologically, Hutton saw a compounding of the same *kind* of events, but his theory applied to the "natural laws and processes that operate in the universe now, have always operated in the universe in the past and apply everywhere in the universe."


 [GB: You have to realize that uniformitarianism is a rough generalization, just like causality, which never expects the causes for any two effects to be identical. Instead, the causes are similar, as per the Ninth Assumption of Science, relativism (All things have characteristics that make them similar to all other things as well as characteristics that make them dissimilar to all other things). In geology, we use uniformitarianism all the time even though we never expect it to work perfectly.]

 TSW:  "[Uniformitarianism] was the perfect key to the future. Taken literally and absolutely, uniformitarianism ... was just another version of finite universal causality."

BW: I don't think that's fair to Hutton. He didn't consider the sedimentary process "perfectly the same" in every geologic age, only the laws (solubility, gravity, etc). But, you can criticize his idea of an "alive Earth" acting as a conscious "superorganism" all you want.

[GB: I suppose you are correct—that is why I included “literally” and “absolutely.” Of course, many indeterminists, who typically believe in absolutism, had trouble with this. If you did not want to believe in uniformitarianism, you would only need one exception to falsify it—probably the best example of the vulnerability of Potter’s “falsification” criterion when used by indeterminists. Neomechanics and infinite universal causality had not been invented yet. Classical mechanics, under which he was working, had all kinds of assumed perfection (identical finite particles, etc.). I understand that some folks still hold to that idea.]

TSW:  "Even those systems coming closest to being perfectly isolated were only approximately so."

BW: In UT [Bill’s “Unimid Theory”], fundamental particles can exist in perfect isolation for a limited time, but anything that qualifies as a "system" certainly cannot. It amazes me that so many experimental physicists imagine "isolated systems" in a gravitational field. Contrary to Einstein's proposition, gravity is not equivalent to acceleration. It is not a "curved space", but rather an energetic process involving objects in motion. Even geosynchronous satellites are affected by gravitational forces (or they wouldn't stay where they are) and they are NOT in any kind of "inertial state".

[GB: Sorry to hear that your theory hypothesizes “perfect isolation” of any kind at any time or place. Mostly, I don’t agree with Einstein either, but I do agree in the Equivalence Principle—a microcosm in inertial motion requires a collision to produce the acceleration needed to change that state, as in Newton’s Second Law of Motion. On the contrary, except for infrequent positioning that requires jet bursts, satellites are in inertial motion. They require an engine to go “up” or “down” with respect to the axis of the vortex in which they exist. Their “horizontal” motions are unpowered, and therefore inertial. The perfectly “straight line” envisioned in Newton’s First Law of Motion cannot exist. That is because all inertial microcosms are parts of vortices of one kind or another.]

TSW:  "At the same moment that any two objects seem to be approaching a former relationship, other objects in the infinite universe are converging on them and diverging from them, ensuring that the relationships between the two objects and others outside the system are never identical at subsequent moments."

BW: Correct, eventually. However, I think spin (even of two connected objects) can persist, without encountering an "event" that modifies their motion, through many cycles. Spin is objective motion, as described in my previous notes, which is what makes it a useful clock.

[GB: Disagree with the word “eventually.” The relationship between two different microcosms is always changing. There is no “eventually” about it. For instance, the relationship between the bat and the ball changes throughout the swing. To consider only the collision between them would be a microcosmic error (i.e., neglect of the macrocosm that includes the surroundings). In addition, no microcosm with or without spin, can exist “without encountering an ‘event’ that modifies” its motion. Again, we assume this with interconnection, as explained in detail in our book, "Universal Cycle Theory: Neomechanics of the Hierarchically Infinite Universe."[1]

TSW:  "As Santayana so wisely put it, "All movements of matter are ... responsive afresh to a total environment never exactly repeated, so that no single law would perfectly define all consecutive changes, ... every response would be that of a newborn organism to an unprecedented world."

BW: A misrepresentation: "laws" don't ignore environmental changes, even if those using them may ignore inconsequential, spurious effects. For example, Newton's law of gravitation doesn't ignore ANY masses "external to" those being scrutinized. When applying the law to calculate the orbit of the earth, scientists will ignore the effects of Ursula Major ... but the law itself does not.

[GB: Disagree. Santayana’s famous statement is correct. There is, in fact, “no single law [that] would perfectly define all consecutive changes.” That is what is meant by the Second Assumption of Science, causality (All effects have an infinite number of material causes). This becomes clear in your own example involving gravity, which becomes even more correct as we discover more and more microcosms in the infinite universe. Many classical mechanists, however, claimed that their finite equations were perfect predictive tools (e.g., Laplace’s Demon). You might want to reread Bohm’s “Causality and chance in modern physics.”[2]

TSW:  "... if one assumes that all effects have an infinite number of causes ..."

BW: Well, we haven't gotten to infinity (yet), so all you've established is that every effect (event) has a cause (matter in motion to collision), not how many causes any particular event might have. However, one only need assume that space and motion are continuous - rather than granular - to arrive at the conclusion that no two collisions are identical. In some respects, "continuity" may be a more important principle than infinity.

[GB: Sorry, but space is not continuous. It always contains an infinity of microcosms. The concept of “continuity” is ill defined, precisely because a definition (“fin” or “finis”) would amount to a contradiction. The “granular” property applies to matter (space, i.e., xyz dimensions), but not to motion, which does not exist and therefore does not have xyz dimensions. Perhaps you are mistaking “continuity” for interconnection.]    

TSW:  "... then it is also necessary to assume that an effect will never occur in exactly the same way twice."

BW: ... although "exactly" is an "idealized" term. We don't need perfection to observe consistent effects from the same type of collisions. For example, if I slap my hand on my desk, it will create a sound every time. The cause is always the same and the effect is always the same, even if they are not "exactly" the same.

[GB: Yes, that is exactly what we do all the time in science. It is why we always have a plus or minus in whatever we do in the natural world. Perfection only can be imagined.]

TSW:  "Not only are any causal laws we can devise finite and therefore incomplete, they also are derived from previously occurring causes."

BW: Only true if the standard is perfection. To say that we are not Gods and cannot realize the abstract ideals or principles we might derive from nature, is not a fault. Abstractions are not nature, only mental conceptions of general traits and processes that we find in nature. Your statement verges on fatalism. We *can* know how things work and we *can* depend on the "unmitigated truths" we discover about nature.

[GB: Sorry that you think giving up finite causality is pessimistic. Folks who know me seem to think that I am anything but fatalistic or even pessimistic. Infinite causality is simply realistic in an infinite universe. We can know how things work, but we don’t need no "unmitigated truths" to do it.]

Next:  Irreversibility (Part 9c)

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[1] Puetz, Stephen J., and Borchardt, Glenn, 2011, Universal cycle theory: Neomechanics of the hierarchically infinite universe: Denver, Outskirts Press ( www.universalcycletheory.com  ), 626 p.

[2] Bohm, David, 1957, Causality and chance in modern physics: New York, Harper and Brothers, 170 p.