Bill’s idealism
confronts reality when he reviews The Tenth Assumption of Science: Interconnection and catches another error.
I
am ever so grateful to Bill Westmiller, whose comments are marked "BW: ". The quotes marked TSW are from "The Scientific
Worldview[1]"
and my comments are marked "[GB: ".
BW: This chapter
is problematic, because the meanings of critical terms are vague or
inconsistent. I've tried to be true to the context, which changes.
TSW: "All things are interconnected; that is,
between any two objects exist other objects that transmit matter and
motion."
BW: Strange presumption, strongly implying a Block Universe: if there are only objects between objects, rather than space, then the entire universe is a singular object, which is perpetually immobile. Usually, such a proposition is a characteristic of an Eternalist Theory, based on a four-dimensional space-time:
BW: Strange presumption, strongly implying a Block Universe: if there are only objects between objects, rather than space, then the entire universe is a singular object, which is perpetually immobile. Usually, such a proposition is a characteristic of an Eternalist Theory, based on a four-dimensional space-time:
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Eternalism_(philosophy_of_time)
... but your description doesn't have space ... and therefore can't have time. If that's the case, then you can't have TWO objects interacting, ever.
[GB: Sorry, but
the assumption clearly states that whatever is between any two objects must be
able to transmit matter and motion. Looks like you are having trouble with
scale again. As a believer in Finite Particle Theory, you must imagine solid
matter to be a possibility. As one who denies that possibility, I am a believer
in WYSIWYG (What You See Is What You Get), regardless of scale. Thus, for me,
your so-called “finite particle” looks like the night sky—filled with all
manner of submicrocosms, each separated by what appears to be empty space. That
is the beauty of Infinite Universe Theory. You need to remember, once again,
that perfectly solid matter and perfectly empty space are only idealizations.
Neither could possibly exist, for they are only ideas. Reality is always something
in between. In other words, at any scale, the area between any two microcosms
will have two constituents: what we might call “solid matter” and what we might
call “empty space.” The “solid matter” always contains “empty space” and the
“empty space” always contains “solid matter”—at all scales. For instance, we
may think the wall to be “solid matter” and the doorway to be “empty space.”
But upon examination we always find that not to be true. The “empty space” of
the doorway contains matter even though that matter provides little resistance
to our passage. This is what we mean when we say that there is matter in motion
between any two microcosms, ad infinitum. Regressive
physicists have so much trouble with this because they assume just the
opposite: finity and disconnection. They really do believe in
the possibility of solid matter and empty space, even though there is no
evidence for it. No wonder they are aether deniers, with all the paradoxes and
contradictions that entails.]
TSW: "The word universe portrays a fundamental property of existence: interconnection."
BW: Every definition I can find is a variant of "All existing matter and space". Etymologically, Latin; uni- (all) -verse ~ -versus (turned) ... into one. The other meanings are variants or subsets of all Westmiller Things (Borchardt material objects, plus any motion, attribute, or process).
So, the concept doesn't "portray" any property, beyond ontological existence. It doesn't require or preclude interaction among any particular things, much less a physical "connection" among all Borchardt Things.
[GB: Right
Bill, “universe” means all turned into one, as in “united we stand” and “United
States.” What is portrayed here is the interconnection between things, people,
and states, not the disconnection. It is the USA, not the DSA (Disconnected
States of America). Indeterminists often do not quite see it that way, favoring
individualism over collectivism and dissimilarity over similarity among
peoples. As cosmogonists they even hypothesize “parallel universes” and
“multiverses” in tune with that mindset. You are right that “universe” only
reaches out toward interconnection.
While it comes close, it is really not a fundamental assumption, because,
unlike interconnection it does
not have an opposite. That is, unless you should get really wild and start to
hypothesize things that are not “part of the universe.” Perhaps the uncaused
causes of your “free will” would qualify.]
TSW: "After disconnecting the world conceptually (analysis), we put it back together again (synthesis)."
BW: The conceptual process isn't necessarily sequential and it is almost always "discriminating" (disconnecting) rather than compounding ("putting it back together"). It may be compounding in the sense of putting selected characteristics into a single word, but the *meaning* of the concept is always a process of identifying essential differentiating attributes.
For example, the definition of "horse" first establishes a category of being (animal) that is distinct from other things (Borchardt Things or Westmiller Things), then a distinct category of animal (mammal), then a distinct category of mammals (vegetarian), then a distinct category of vegetarian things that are solid-hoofed, domesticated, with a flowing mane and tail. There is no "synthesis" beyond assigning those characteristics to a single concept. A good definition ensures that the discriminating characteristics are, as a compound set, both unique and essential. You don't define "horse" as an object with legs ... which would be distinct from a stool ... even if legs are clearly a characteristic of horses.
TSW: "After disconnecting the world conceptually (analysis), we put it back together again (synthesis)."
BW: The conceptual process isn't necessarily sequential and it is almost always "discriminating" (disconnecting) rather than compounding ("putting it back together"). It may be compounding in the sense of putting selected characteristics into a single word, but the *meaning* of the concept is always a process of identifying essential differentiating attributes.
For example, the definition of "horse" first establishes a category of being (animal) that is distinct from other things (Borchardt Things or Westmiller Things), then a distinct category of animal (mammal), then a distinct category of mammals (vegetarian), then a distinct category of vegetarian things that are solid-hoofed, domesticated, with a flowing mane and tail. There is no "synthesis" beyond assigning those characteristics to a single concept. A good definition ensures that the discriminating characteristics are, as a compound set, both unique and essential. You don't define "horse" as an object with legs ... which would be distinct from a stool ... even if legs are clearly a characteristic of horses.
[GB: As in the
Sixth Assumption of Science, complementarity (All things are
subject to divergence and convergence from other things), analysis and
synthesis follow the same pattern. Nothing can be synthesized unless there are parts to
bring together. One cannot have a new idea without first gathering the
ingredients for that new idea. It makes no sense to overemphasize either
analysis or synthesis. In detective work, legal work, and in other scientific
endeavors we gather bits of evidence first and then put it together to provide
the appropriate narrative. We may reverse the process to “take the story
apart,” examining each bit of evidence, perhaps from an alternative viewpoint
that may destroy the logic of the narrative provided.
Your horse
example is a good example. We define a horse by gathering the bits of evidence
necessary to list a sufficient number of the infinite number of characteristics
that it has. We put these all together and voila!
We have a horse. Note that the whole process of “defining” is made necessary by
interconnection. Definition
requires us to make finite that which is infinite. To define a particular horse
as a horse, we must ignore many of the infinite number of characteristics that
make each horse unique.]
TSW: "The philosophical choice we need to make is not between an assumption of continuity and an assumption of discontinuity, but between a deterministic assumption that includes both of those ideas and an indeterministic assumption that does not."
BW: In order to have a deterministic cause, there has to be an effect (a distinct event). If there is no event, then discontinuity is true. If there is an event, then there is some cause. The cause doesn't have to be any continuous "connection", only a momentary interaction (usually a collision). Granted, some causes for some events are continuous (gravity), but that isn't required. It isn't "idealism" to observe no event, or an effect, that is the result of momentary interactions.
TSW: "The philosophical choice we need to make is not between an assumption of continuity and an assumption of discontinuity, but between a deterministic assumption that includes both of those ideas and an indeterministic assumption that does not."
BW: In order to have a deterministic cause, there has to be an effect (a distinct event). If there is no event, then discontinuity is true. If there is an event, then there is some cause. The cause doesn't have to be any continuous "connection", only a momentary interaction (usually a collision). Granted, some causes for some events are continuous (gravity), but that isn't required. It isn't "idealism" to observe no event, or an effect, that is the result of momentary interactions.
[GB: Sorry, but
the absence of observable events is no proof of disconnection, or, as you say, discontinuity. With matter being
infinitely subdividable, there are always collisions, such as those between
aether-1 particles and aether-2 particles of which we
will necessarily be unaware. What we do observe as a momentary interaction
(i.e., a collision) necessarily occurs in a macrocosm containing a milieu of
supermicrocosms. After all, that is why we have observed and assumed the Second Assumption of Science, causality (All effects have an
infinite number of material causes). Also, there are no “continuous causes,”
because all causes are produced by discrete collisions between microcosms.
Gravitation, for instance, is produced by discrete impacts by aether-1
particles on what we call baryonic (ordinary) matter.[1]
Whether or not one observes a particular event has nothing to do with idealism,
although the belief that unseen events cannot occur definitely is.]
TSW: "Outer space is a good example. How can
both qualities, discontinuity and continuity, apply to what is commonly
envisioned by the naïve realist as completely empty?"
BW: If we recognize that concepts are *entirely* differentiation, there's no problem in distinguishing the *separation* of objects (a Westmiller Thing) from the objects themselves (a Borchardt Thing). Asserting that there is "space" between the Earth and Moon simply says they are separated, not that the space is "completely empty" of all other, incidental, objects. Nor does it say that they are "completely isolated", since everyone knows that they are gravitationally connected and persistently exchange photons. You seem to be fabricating an inconsistency that doesn't exist: Borchardt Things separated by space doesn't require space to be empty.
BW: If we recognize that concepts are *entirely* differentiation, there's no problem in distinguishing the *separation* of objects (a Westmiller Thing) from the objects themselves (a Borchardt Thing). Asserting that there is "space" between the Earth and Moon simply says they are separated, not that the space is "completely empty" of all other, incidental, objects. Nor does it say that they are "completely isolated", since everyone knows that they are gravitationally connected and persistently exchange photons. You seem to be fabricating an inconsistency that doesn't exist: Borchardt Things separated by space doesn't require space to be empty.
[GB: Again, I
am confused by your terminology about Westmiller and Borchardt things. I do not
know about your things, but mine are called “microcosms,” implying that they
are xyz portions of the universe that exist within the rest of the universe,
which I call the “macrocosm.” I believe the quote was purely rhetorical. I am
glad to see that you now believe that space cannot be perfectly empty.
TSW: "As I see it, an 'element of spatial extent' can represent one of two possibilities: either it is something or it is nothing."
BW: It is a Westmiller Thing, not a Borchardt Thing; attributes are things; separation is an attribute of two objects (otherwise they would be one object). Totally independent of that attribute is the issue of whether the separation (space) also contains other Borchardt Things. It probably does, but they are irrelevant to the Separation Thing.
TSW: "As I see it, an 'element of spatial extent' can represent one of two possibilities: either it is something or it is nothing."
BW: It is a Westmiller Thing, not a Borchardt Thing; attributes are things; separation is an attribute of two objects (otherwise they would be one object). Totally independent of that attribute is the issue of whether the separation (space) also contains other Borchardt Things. It probably does, but they are irrelevant to the Separation Thing.
[GB: Sorry, but
separation cannot be an attribute of both things. The fact that there is a
distance between you and me is not an attribute of either one of us. It is an
attribute of whatever separates us (Interstate 5, etc.). Glad to see that you
agree that there is stuff between us, though I do not think some of it is
irrelevant.]
TSW: "If an 'element of spatial extent' is something, then it must have matter within it ..."
BW: Not at all. Westmiller Things are not containers, they are relationships among Borchardt Things. Separation is not a material object that "contains" anything. It is not a constraint, it is an attribute. Of course, Westmiller Things also include Borchardt Things, but attributes themselves don't necessarily have attributes. (That was one of Einstein's logical errors: giving "separation" an attribute of "curved" in "space".)
TSW: "If an 'element of spatial extent' is something, then it must have matter within it ..."
BW: Not at all. Westmiller Things are not containers, they are relationships among Borchardt Things. Separation is not a material object that "contains" anything. It is not a constraint, it is an attribute. Of course, Westmiller Things also include Borchardt Things, but attributes themselves don't necessarily have attributes. (That was one of Einstein's logical errors: giving "separation" an attribute of "curved" in "space".)
[GB: Well,
Bill, at least you are consistent. Sorry, that you think that your things are
relationships. Real things are microcosms that have xyz dimensions and location
with respect to other things. I normally refrain from thinking of microcosms as
containers, although that would be better than thinking of them as
relationships. You are a “container” for your various parts, not a
relationship. Again, the separation between microcosms does indeed have
attributes, which, in turn, do indeed have attributes, ad infinitum. The
Einsteinism (right answer; wrong reason) with respect to “curved empty space”
worked out, not because space was empty, but because it was not empty. This was
especially noticeable wherever baryonic matter formed an atmosphere around a
cosmic body, as it did around the Sun in the famous Eddington observation. The
refraction of distant starlight was misinterpreted as evidence for curved empty
space and/or the effect of gravitation on Einstein’s hypothetical light
corpuscle.]
TSW: "... the opposing indeterministic
assumption that between any two objects there can exist solid, continuous
matter or empty, discontinuous space."
BW: If there is solid, continuous matter between two objects, they aren't two objects. It might be one object with two or three different parts, but it can't be considered two distinct Borchardt Things. Yet, that seems to be what you're asserting is true: that "all things are interconnected"; physically linked or attached. If that is the case, there aren't two distinct objects anywhere in the universe. In that case, there can't be determinism, because there can be no cause and effect, because there can be no action between distinct objects.
BW: If there is solid, continuous matter between two objects, they aren't two objects. It might be one object with two or three different parts, but it can't be considered two distinct Borchardt Things. Yet, that seems to be what you're asserting is true: that "all things are interconnected"; physically linked or attached. If that is the case, there aren't two distinct objects anywhere in the universe. In that case, there can't be determinism, because there can be no cause and effect, because there can be no action between distinct objects.
[GB: Bill,
please reread the quote. That is the indeterministic assumption. Where have I
ever claimed that matter could be solid and continuous?]
BW: You do phrase it slightly differently in the prior case: "between any two objects exist other objects that transmit matter and motion." Nevertheless, the word "any" precludes the possibility of transmission from one object to the next, because there is always some smaller Borchardt Thing between them, to infinity. The statements you're contrasting seem to me absolutely the same: a Block Universe.
BW: You do phrase it slightly differently in the prior case: "between any two objects exist other objects that transmit matter and motion." Nevertheless, the word "any" precludes the possibility of transmission from one object to the next, because there is always some smaller Borchardt Thing between them, to infinity. The statements you're contrasting seem to me absolutely the same: a Block Universe.
[GB: Huh?
Perhaps you are thinking that, because there are things between things ad
infinitum, that this is the same as solid matter. Not possible,
because the subdivision of microcosms containing matter and space always yields
small microcosms containing…you guessed it: matter and
space, ad infinitum. The “Block Universe” filled with solid matter
that you hypothesize (just like your finite particles) is only an idealization.
It cannot exist.]
BW: Beyond that, the second clause of the quote above says the opposing view proposes "empty, discontinuous space" between objects. This makes no sense. If space is completely empty, it is continuously empty, not "discontinuously empty", which is a self-contradictory phrase.
BW: Beyond that, the second clause of the quote above says the opposing view proposes "empty, discontinuous space" between objects. This makes no sense. If space is completely empty, it is continuously empty, not "discontinuously empty", which is a self-contradictory phrase.
[GB: Sorry, the
hypothesized “pure empty space” of the indeterminist has no properties
whatsoever. Being nothing at all, you cannot ascribe any properties to it at
all. You might call it a continuation of emptiness or a discontinuity. You are
right that the term “discontinuous space” needs to be removed from the second
edition.]
Continued as 12b…
cotsw 024
[1] Borchardt, Glenn, and
Puetz, Stephen J. , 2012, Neomechanical gravitation theory (
http://www.worldsci.org/pdf/abstracts/abstracts_6529.pdf ), in Volk, G.,
Proceedings of the Natural Philosophy Alliance, 19th Conference of the NPA,
25-28 July: Albuquerque, NM, Natural Philosophy Alliance, Mt. Airy, MD, v. 9,
p. 53-58.