Blog 20150729 by Bill
Westmiller, Lucretius, and Glenn Borchardt
[GB: Long-time
readers will remember Bill Westmiller, who wrote numerous blogs critiquing "The
Scientific Worldview." His criticisms were educational because they were
given from the standpoint of classical mechanics and classical determinism. The
distinguishing feature of that point of view is the belief in finity, which was necessary for Bill’s
current attempt to update Finite Particle Theory. That theory was enunciated a
couple thousand years ago by Lucretius, who I will quote after Bill has his
say:]
BW: Your readers may not be
interested in ontology, but I couldn't ignore the opportunity to dispute one of
your assumptions..
BW: Correct, but what is an idealization?
It's the abstraction of a concept from reality. We observe every day, in every
way, that all physical objects have XYZ spatial boundaries. They have
characteristics that are confined to those boundaries, distinct and separate
from other objects. The distance between physical objects is real, whether
or not that separation is occupied by other distinct objects.
BW: It is true that we
intentionally or incidentally ignore the other objects that may or may not be
occupying the space that separates any two distinct objects, but it is for a
good reason: if they exist, they aren't relevant or consequential to the
characteristics of the two objects that exist within their own boundaries.
BW: Of course, relevance means
relevant to us, as human beings. If there are no consequential effects on us,
within our limited time horizon and the proximity of objects to our own
physical boundaries, then those intermediate objects don't demand our
attention: we can safely ignore them. At some point, we may recognize that those
intermediate objects are consequential, even essential, to our well-being, but
they are still distinct from the substantive objects that are immediately
evident.
BW: Thus, we recognize the
difference between a banana and a table: that they are distinct objects with
unique characteristics, separated by space. We assign no relevance to the
space, even if it is occupied by atoms of air or gravitational
effects between their masses. Those intermediate objects may be
consequential to the degradation of the banana or table over long periods of
time and it's may become useful to understand the effects of oxygen molecules
on both, but those objects only become consequential to us IF that knowledge
allows us to obtain some direct benefit from understanding the cause and
effects of oxidation.
BW: So, while we
recognize that the spatial separation of objects is not a perfect vacuum,
there is still a separation and the evident objects do have distinct
characteristics which are immediately relevant to our interests. Therefore, we
can reasonably ignore the intermediate objects in the pursuit of our
understanding of the inherent characteristics of the objects themselves,
disregarding any incidental effects of any minor influences of the intermediate
objects. That is what science does every day:
"[Space]
is one end member in the solid matter-empty space continuum that we use to
understand the universe."
>Neither
“perfectly solid matter” nor “perfectly empty space” can exist.
BW: Granting that science
has not yet identified either case, since our reduction of causation is a
continuing pursuit, there is no reason to assume that neither of those cases
can exist in nature. Our idealizations do not dictate to reality, one way or
the other; they are simply derived from reality. The proposition that neither
can exist is itself an idealization. [GB: True.]
BW: Besides, there are good
reasons to assume that they can and do exist. [GB: False, although, as with all
fundamental assumptions, it is impossible to prove whether infinity
or your implied finity is correct.]
BW: For example, we cannot even
imagine or surmise Newton's Second Law if it were never the case that
objects collide. A collision requires a separation of two objects in relative
motion that have distinct boundaries. If there is no space between them, then
neither object can have motion and no collision is possible. That is, motion
requires the assumption of empty space, into which an object can move without
impediment. [GB: False, empty space is not required, just as perfectly empty
space is not required for me to go through a doorway. The “impediment” produced
by the presence of air molecules is insignificant.]
BW: That objects can collide
requires the assumption that they were not previously in contact: that nothing
existed between them to preclude contact. [GB: Your “nothing” does not have to
be completely empty.]
BW: Therefore, we cannot assume
that empty space does not exist, nor that objects do not have spatial
boundaries, and still arrive at Newton's Second Law. [GB: False. Perfectly
empty space is not needed for Newton's Second Law of Motion to work. It just
has to have weaker microcosms.]
GB
Writes:
>In
other words, nonexistence is impossible.
BW: No thing does not exist, but
it does not follow that all existence is occupied by some thing (object). In
fact, it is logically impossible for an object to exist as an object unless it
is separate and distinct from other objects. Thus, there must be XYZ regions of
space which are not objects; they have no separate and distinct characteristics
or effects; they are no thing. [GB: Sorry, but that contradicts the Eighth
Assumption of Science, infinity (The universe is infinite,
both in the microcosmic and macrocosmic directions).]
BW: We say that space
"exists" only in the sense that it is a relationship between two
objects: it has no characteristic independent of those objects. Space has no
boundaries or attributes except as a referent to the separation of two or more
objects. Literally, it has no independent "existence" since it is no
thing (object).
[GB: False,
even Einstein (1920) eventually admitted that space had properties: "Careful
reflection teaches us that special relativity does not compel us to deny ether.
We may assume its existence but not ascribe a definite state of motion to it
..." "There is a weighty reason in favour of ether. To deny ether is
to ultimately assume that empty space has no physical qualities whatever."]
BW: But, relationships do exist.
Motion is purely a relative or relational "thing" that certainly
exists among objects. [GB: False, motion is not a thing and does not exist
among objects. Motion is what those microcosms do.]
BW: Motion would be impossible
for objects in the absence of the "thing" called space. Thus,
"nonexistance" (a "non-object") is essential for the
existence of material objects in motion "through" space.
Therefore,
nonexistence is not merely possible, it is essential. [GB: False. The belief in
nonexistence and the claim that space can be perfectly empty (in the face of
all the scientific data to the contrary) are corollaries of the indeterministic
assumption of creation.]
[GB: Now for
Lucretius and his critique of Aristotelianism:]
[GB: So you see
that this discussion has been going on for millennia with no resolution. Aristotle
(384 BCE) was a “splitter,” writing that “it is impossible for anything
continuous to be composed of indivisible parts” and Lucretius (99
BCE) was a “nonspliter.” Of course, the unsplitable “atoms” hypothesized by
Lucretius eventually were found to contain a combination of “matter” and “space.”
Nonetheless, modern-day atomists, such as yourself and Abu-Baker (2009) still believe
that, ultimately, there must exist a subatomic particle filled with perfectly ideal,
solid matter surrounded by perfectly empty space (nonexistence). Of course,
none of that is possible in neomechanics, which is the application of mechanics
in light of the Eighth Assumption of Science, infinity (The universe is
infinite, both in the microcosmic and macrocosmic directions).
Like all things involving
the infinite universe, the determinism-free will debate and the infinite-finite
debates go on forever. Although these debates are pedagogical, the resulting
choices have the potential to affect careers and the course of scientific
philosophy. Progress in science requires that we discard belief in free will, perfectly solid matter, perfectly empty space, and the possibility of nonexistence.]
References:
Abu-Bakr,
Mohammed, 2009, The End of Pseudo-Science: Essays Refuting False Scientific
Theories Taught in Schools, Colleges, and Universities: Bloomington, IN,
iUniverse, 88 p.
Aristotle,
350 B.C.E., Physics, v. VI. [ http://classics.mit.edu/Aristotle/physics.6.vi.html#752
]
Einstein,
Albert, 1920, Sidelights on relativity: 1. Ether and relativity. 2. Geometry and
experience: London, Methuen, 56 p.
Lucretius,
60 BCE [1994], On the nature of the universe: New York, Penguin Classics, 336
p. [ http://www.amazon.com/On-Nature-Universe-Penguin-Classics/dp/0140446109
]