For clarity, I'll assume (you don't say) that your "things" are only "material objects", in contrast with my "things" as any object or condition amenable to abstraction. This presumptive "attitude" is just "my thing".
BW: So ... it is true that all *material objects* are similar to all other things that have matter. It is also true that all material objects have position, motion, and environments that are dissimilar from all other material objects. Therefore, for Borchardt Things, your statement is true.
BW: However, for Westmiller Things, it isn't necessarily true. Gravity is not "similar to" any other things. Mass in any one thing is not "dissimilar" to mass in all other things. Electrons have characteristics that are not "dissimilar" to other electrons, although electrons are "dissimilar" to all things that are not electrons.
TSW: "The Law of Identity or Equality, A = A, that is, every concept is equal to itself."
BW: That's not the usual meaning. It isn't that concepts are equal, but that a "thing" is what it is. It can't be an Apple and a Non-Apple at the same time. This is a statement about nature, dictated by logic, not consciousness. Granted, we use concepts to refer to "things", but that just requires that our definitions of terms be rational and consistent with reality. E.g.: You can't have nothing that is something.
TSW: "There are no strict identities because all matter is in constant motion; no thing can be what it was just a moment before."
BW: There's a difference between identity and position. A Borchardt Thing doesn't cease to be what it is, simply because it's position, relative to other things, has changed. Since all translational motion is relative, we can't even say that a thing has moved. Maybe it's just the other things that are moving. Your formulation suggests that a Borchardt Thing becomes *something else*, or nothing else, because other things are moving.
BW: IF you're considering the Westmiller Thing called "motion" to be a *characteristic* of the Borchardt Thing called "object", then nothing ever has any identity at all. One second, an Apple is an Apple, but the next millisecond (due to the rotation of the earth) it is something else. That's a VERY strange way to view Borchardt Things.
[GB: Huh? Motion is not a thing.]
TSW: "Absolutism is consupponible with certainty and that bulwark of classical mechanism, the notion of finite universal causality."
BW: I understand your intent, but I think you're just defining terms in such a way as to make them appear to be logically coherent (consupponible). For example, it isn't "absolutism" to assert that a Borchardt Thing retains its identity, irrespective of its relative motion. It might be "absolutism" to say that an Apple is forever an Apple, even after it rots and disintegrates into a pile of chemical compounds.
BW: The logically coherent interpretation of this sentence is that no Borchardt Thing can ever be described. Nothing has any identity unless every Westmiller Thing about it remains static. The conclusion has to be that we can never know anything about reality, even if what we assert is an unmitigated truth. If that's the case, why even bother to make the effort of putting one word after another in an effort to describe reality, or relativity, or infinity?