Bill has
trouble with truth, knowledge, information and the differences between reasoning
via analogy, disparity, deduction, and induction.
I am ever so
grateful to Bill Westmiller, whose comments are marked "BW: ". The
quotes marked "TSW: " are from "The Scientific Worldview" and my comments
are marked "[GB: ".
The
Mind-Brain Muddle (Part 3 of 7)
TSW: "In practice, truth is
the relation between the microcosm of knowledge, and the macrocosm of
information. Thus the 'truth' varies from person to person."
BW: This is the "subjective reality" view, but I wouldn't call it
"truth", even as an aphorism. It puts hallucinations on a par with
validated, logical assertions based on objective evidence. For the mystic, the
Bible contains information about supreme beings, never warranted by any
evidence or logic, so they assert it as 'true'. That assertion is mitigated by
everything we know "for certain" about reality.
[GB: I stand
by the quote. “Truth” is necessarily a subjective term. It is true that water
runs downhill, but neither the water, nor the hill care whether that claim is
true or false. Thus the appellation “true” or “false” is not a characteristic
of the external world without perceptive beings. As you can see from Wikipedia,
the subject of truth is infinitely complicated and a fundamental part of the
philosophical struggle:
I prefer my
dialectic between knowledge and information. It fits the univironmental concept
and explains a lot about why folks have such great disagreements about the
truth. Each person necessarily has limited knowledge and limited information
about the world. Characteristically, you cherry-pick what you call “evidence”
in asserting what you call your “unmitigated” “for certain” knowledge about
reality. You deny the priest his bible as evidence for his “truth” claims, but
accept your own claims for free will without any evidence at all. Of course, I
otherwise agree with you that truth is the closest correspondence between what
we think of reality and what it actually is. Obviously, in science, we discover
truth via observation and experiment, with the best theory (“what we think of
reality”) being the one that predicts the results of the next observation or
experiment.]
TSW: "The mere addition of another book to
the shelf may increase one’s store of information, but without an interaction
with the human microcosm, the information in the book never becomes
knowledge."
BW: This strikes me as an error of definition. The book couldn't exist
if the author had no knowledge of the topic. That the mode of communication is
a physical object (book) doesn't make it simple "matter". Of course,
if no other person ever reads the book, then it is fruitless as a means of communicating
knowledge, whether it contains objectively factual information or not.
[GB: Huh? I
think you just argued yourself out of that one. Knowledge involves the process
of knowing, which involves the motions of electrons within the brain. The book
does not have that no matter how it got here. The book may be infinitely
complicated matter, but it is still matter. As we say, it is an “instrument” (i.e.,
a “thing”) of communication.]
TSW:
"We may speculate that disparate facts,
like other kinds of matter, eventually produce chemical reactions within the
brain that we experience as mental conflict."
BW: The brain mechanism may be chemical, but the "disparity"
is a matter of logic, which may mitigate the truth of any assertion. The
"mental conflict" isn't a chemical necessity, since the chemicals (or
neurons) have no means of determining whether any abstract assertion is true or
false. It is only the *process* of logical analysis that recognizes
inconsistencies between two alleged facts ... or a discontinuity with objective
evidence.
[GB: And what
is “the *process* of logical analysis”? You seem to be implying that somehow,
this process does not occur in the brain—sort of like your “free will” that
apparently is matterless motion floating around in the air. Sorry, but all logical
analysis occurs inside the brain as an infinitely complicated physical/chemical
process. We will never completely understand how this works, but recent work
has been taking the first baby steps in that direction, and none of it involves
any processes outside the brain.]
TSW: "... new combinations - ideas - result
when the contradictions between facts or theories are reconciled."
BW: Again, trying to squeeze a process into a dialectic analysis, which
is flimsy, subjective, and unenlightening. New ideas don't result from
contradictions, but from concurrences. That is, we observe patterns of events
that share common characteristics with patterns we already know, suggesting a
similar cause ... not a contradiction. The previous example of a falling ball
and a falling brick apply. A recent invention is another good example: a young
student [Andraka] who was concurrently studying antibodies
and nanotubes realized that the properties of one could affect the
properties of the other, inventing a cheap, fast, highly accurate cancer
detector. See his TEDx presentation:
[GB: Remember
that we think in two fundamentally different ways: 1) by analogy and 2) by
disparity. In science we do this all the time, of course, as you just did by
stressing analogy, which is the way in which much of “ordinary” science is done
a la Kuhn. The greatest breakthroughs
involving “revolutionary” science, however, often come about when we discover
disparities, contradictions that are not solved via the smooth processes you described.
My toughest scientific problems tend to be of this nature. They present a big
headache, often keeping me awake at night continually rehearsing the
conflicting data. Being somewhat persistent, however, I tend to keep at it,
going outside the field in the attempt to discover new information. My little
brain finally settles down only after I find the reasons for the contradiction
at hand.]
TSW:
"There are two basic approaches to
problem solving: the microcosmic (deductive) and the macrocosmic
(inductive)."
BW: There's nothing "micro or macro" about the two. Both are
pattern recognition techniques, which have different characteristics. Deduction
takes two or more assumptions about reality, applies sequential logic, and
arrives at a conclusion. Generally speaking, it doesn't "solve
problems" or "create new ideas", it just describes the logical
consequence of the premises. Induction takes the same assumptions and
identifies logical relationships between one or more of their properties, which
can identify novel causes or produce new effects. The two techniques aren't
opposites and are usually applied in series to discover new facts or create new
effects. Without induction, Andraka would never have consolidated the
properties of antibodies, nanotubes, and electrical resistance. Without
deduction, he couldn't have found an effective means of combining them to produce
a useful result.
[GB: You
missed half of it. You are right about deduction being micro, a logical
consequence of the information at hand. What you consider induction is really deduction,
which “takes
the same assumptions and identifies logical relationships between one or more
of their properties.” Deduction
occurs in a closed system (that is why I call it microcosmic); induction
obtains information from outside the system (that is why I call it macrocosmic).
You implied this yourself when you mentioned how Andraka brought information
about antibodes, nanotubes and electrical resistance to the problem at hand.
Induction always requires convergence from outside the microcosm. You
recognized this with your word “consolidated.” Once brought to the table, the
data, theories, or ideas can be used to discover their logical consequences.
After all, that is how we get new ideas. We combine old idea A with old idea B to
form new idea C. That is why those with experience in many disciplines and those
who travel widely come up with so many innovations. That is why the solution to
many a puzzle involves induction (macrocosmic thinking). We often need to “think
outside the box” or travel far to bring back the missing piece that will
complete the puzzle.]
TSW:
"With macrocosmic thinking (induction),
we search for materials normally not considered within the confines of the
microcosm of the problem. This approach, although often inefficient, is
potentially the most creative."
BW: I agree, but there's nothing macroscopic about it. Here's an
interesting article on analytical induction and deduction, titled
"Predicting the Future is Hard":
[GB: Huh? The
word is “macrocosmic.” It has little in common with the word “macroscopic.”
Macrocosmic things are outside the microcosm (any particular xyz portion of the
universe, large or small). Sorry, but neither induction nor deduction was in
the article. Of course, Bayesian reasoning, which was mentioned, requires
sporadic induction in the form of updated information from outside the analysis
at hand. This is in contrast to frequentist
reasoning, a deductive approach that does not.]
TSW:
"We also may speculate that new ideas
appear as new brain states - actual physicochemical combinations or material
interconnections that have never occurred before."
BW: Everything we commit to memory is a "new physio-chemical
combination" in the brain. Every fact we acquire from reality, or the
communication of other peoples observations, forms a novel connection in our
brain. However, it isn't necessarily the case that those material configurations
of neurons have "never occurred before". Abstract concepts, whether
new or not, probably are the same in every individual that acquires them. It's
called learning and is the foundation of language.
[GB: Sorry,
you missed the point: “new ideas” require “new brain states.” That is why,
unless we already have the old ideas and thus their correlative old brain
states, we neither understand the new ideas or formulate the new brain states.
You are right that all memories are new physio-chemical combinations. And like
other microcosms, these combinations may be similar in some respects and
dissimilar in others, per relativism.
TSW: "It is only through success in predicting
the future that the brain, knowledge, information, and ideas are of any
use."
BW: Rather vague. Knowledge identifies truthful assertions about causes
and effects, which are just as true in the past - before the evidence was
acquired - as it will be in the future. Nor are valid ideas necessarily good
predictors of what will happen in the future. For example, Darwin's theory
didn't predict *what* changes would occur in future species evolution, only
*how* those changes would occur and had occurred in the past. Moreover, as you
noted earlier, knowledge is contextual. When contexts change, the knowledge
fails to predict ... even if it was absolutely true in another context. That
water boils at 212°F is a fact, but only at sea level, not on a
mountain.
PS: An
engaging article on "causal completeness" that you might find
interesting:
On The Causal
Completeness Of Physics, Part I
Massimo Pigliucci
“I could quit here and declare victory over Weinberg: the CCP that he
invoked does not do the work that he thinks he does (specifically, eliminating
the possibility of emergent properties), although it does do the job we both
want it to do (eliminate dualism, vitalism and supernaturalism).” -Pigiucci
[GB: Thanks
Bill. I also declare victory over Weinberg (and Pigliucci). The article shows
that both of them are still stuck in their belief in finite causality, with the
implication that most scientists are no different. Weinberg is completely wrong
in supporting classical mechanics at this late date. That remains a clear
violation of the Second Assumption of Science, causality (All effects have an
infinite number of material causes). Pigliucci is correct that the
indeterminist’s finite causality could never produce emergent properties. In
fact, if classical mechanics were absolutely true, the universe would not even exist.
On the other hand, Pigliucci has his own problems (see https://newhumanist.org.uk/2843/science-needs-philosophy).
You may remember that in "The Scientific Worldview" I mentioned that in
all of science we are always necessarily working with reductions (e.g.,
neomechanics) or expansions (e.g., univironmental determinism). Pigliucci, like
the religious folks, has taken it upon himself to claim that reductions, no
matter how successful, inevitably miss the stuff that philosophers and
humanists like himself can supply. He claims that “humanism is about taking seriously the
complexity of the human condition and the limits of human knowledge.” If you do
not grant this opening afforded by the Eighth Assumption of Science, infinity (The universe is infinite,
both in the microcosmic and macrocosmic directions) and the Second Assumption
of Science, causality (All
effects have an infinite number of material causes), he will slander you with the
epithet called “scientism.” Like other indeterminists, he cannot get over “the
idea that science is the ultimate arbiter of any question, or indeed even of
what counts as a meaningful question.” Like the religious folks, he is implying
that there are other ways of knowing that do not involve logic and the
interpretation of evidence. A pox on both their houses!]
Next: Ethics
(Part 4 of 7)
cotsw 052
[GB: And what is “the *process* of logical analysis”? You seem to be implying that somehow, this process does not occur in the brain ...]
ReplyDeleteNot at all: it is a brain function. I just completed reading John Stuart Mill's "System of Logic" which is exceptional and provides the best description I've seen of the process, differentiating the elements of deduction and induction. It's a FREE book on Amazon Kindle:
http://tinyurl.com/m9a2qzf
[GB: ... Like the religious folks, [Pigliucci] is implying that there are other ways of knowing that do not involve logic and the interpretation of evidence. A pox on both their houses!]
Aside from my semantic quibbles, I think we generally agree on the topic.
Bill