BW: Confusing, given your definitions. Objects have volume and occupy space, but motion also requires space between the objects to differentiate them as objects. It doesn't have to be "absolutely empty" space, just a separation that gives each object a distinct identity. In my conception, that separation is also a "thing" in the "universe". So, I don't think it's correct to say:
TSW: "The term space, used is this way, becomes another abstraction for 'all things,' i.e., matter."
BW: Space (both occupied by matter and the separation between material objects) is a thing and therefore a part of the universe. It can't be that "all things" ... the universe ... is matter. If that were the case, the entire universe would be ONE solid object. Apparently, it isn't.
TSW: "For the determinist, space is something; for the indeterminist, space is nothing."
BW: Odd. Didn't you just say that space is NOT a "thing"? Yes, space is "some thing" in the universe, but I don't think it is characteristic of indeterminism to assert that "space is nothing". It might be a characteristic of idealism, which imagines "perfectly empty" space, but idealists can also be determinists ... characterized by Gottfried Leibniz:
"... despite Leibniz's protestations, his God is more the architect and engineer of the vast complex world-system than the embodiment of love ..."
TSW: "Only in ideality could matter and space be considered opposites."
BW: Agreed, but idealism is not the same as immaterialism or indeterminism. I don't think any of the advocates would say that matter and space are "opposites", only that matter occupies some space and not other space. Aside from the pure idealist, they would all agree with you that space "evinces varying degrees of solidity and emptiness".
TSW: "Time is motion ... we measure time by measuring the motion of things."
BW: I don't think it's correct to equate the two, even if time requires motion. Nor do I think it's satisfactory to define time as something that exists only because we measure it. That's subjectivism, made explicit by Einstein: "Time has no independent existence apart from the order of events by which we measure it." This kind of definition implies that time doesn't exist until (or unless) humans measure it: a variant of Copenhagen mysticism.
BW: My attempt: Time is the relationship between a past and present state of matter. If there were no distinction between the two states, time would not exist. We *quantify* the distinction by reference to some objectively cyclical motion, usually characterized as a clock. Universally, time exists independent of clocks, since there is and always has been some change in the state of some matter. If all things in existence were static, there would be no distinction between past and present states and there would be no time.
TSW: "Universal time is the motion of each thing relative to all other things."
BW: Roughly the same thing as my explication, but you seem to be objectifying "A Superior Time" as distinct from, but dependent upon, the composite of ALL times (ie: all possible relationships). From my perspective, there is no singular Universal Time, nor any singular, universal clock.
TSW: "Speculations about going 'back in time' are mere amusements in science fiction."
BW: Agreed, but I think my definition makes it clearer that a change in the relationship of two states has no plus or minus values and the *quantification* by reference to a clock is always cumulative.
TSW: "But dimensionality is a property of matter; it is not a property of motion because motion does not exist; it occurs."
BW: I like this, but I think it would be more precise to say that dimensional quantities objectively exist in matter, while the quantification of time (used to measure motion) is only *fabricated* by reference to a clock. As noted earlier, I don't think it's proper to say motion (or time) do *not exist* as things, amid all things (the universe), including objects.
TSW: "... dialectical nature of the world ..."
BW: I'll just repeat my assertion that dialectics is a useful procedure for humans to pursue truth, but that is a statement about our ability to form and modify valid concepts ... it is not a characteristic of nature. I'm not a fan of Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel.
1. That matter could occur without motion ..."
BW: Matter doesn't "occur" as an event in time, whether it's moving or not. Conservation requires that it always existed, in one state or another. Conservation also requires that it only moves when it is moved; it only changes it's relationship to other objects as the result of a collision "event" with another object. It doesn't "not exist" until it collides with another object, nor cease to exist when the collision ends.
TSW: "2. That motion could occur without matter ..."
"3. That matter is motion
"4. That motion is matter
BW: Agreed, though #4 seems to contradict your earlier proposition that motion is not a "thing" distinct from matter.
BW: In general, there's very little to disagree with in this chapter (in spite of my prolific notes on syntax and terminology). At worst, we disagree on whether motion "creates" matter or that matter "requires" motion for its existence.