TSW: "... views each act, each motion, of the human microcosm as a means to satisfy some human need."
BW: We assume there is a motive: a cause for the act that is believed to produce some desired effect. But, there may be no conscious motive at all, or the actual effects may be detrimental ... sometimes repeatedly self-destructive. I don't think "satisfy needs" covers the full gamut of human motives, from biological requirements to casual whims.
For example, I jvst substituted the letter 'u' with a 'v'. Certainly, not because I "needed" to do that, since I could have made the point in a
hundred other ways. A "need" to be cute? Just a mistake that I decided to exploit, after the fact? So, I don't think it's accurate to ascribe every human act as motivated by need, nor even motivated - in the sense of rationally intended - at all.
TSW: "... needs are particular univironments resulting in particular kinds of behavior."
BW: I realize that you're trying to make the case for your own form of "mechanism", but this isn't a definition. There are five different meanings of the word "need" that have nothing to do with environments motivating behavior. I prefer "a lack of something required", but your assertion doesn't even state the meaning you intend.
TSW: "... all behavior must be seen as liberal action toward a conservative end."
BW: Again, you don't define terms. Do you mean to say that all human acts are "marked by generosity", with the objective of "maintaining existing conditions"? Benevolent slavery? Productive altruism? Or, just an "equilibrium" of opportunities for action?
TSW: "Needs imply imminent behavior ..."
BW: Not necessarily. I have a "need" to write my Unimid Theory. That isn't imminent and it certainly won't result in any kind of "equilibrium". If you define need as a "lack of something imminently required", then my only need is to inhale the next breath. By another meaning, I only need to eat and defecate. By another, I have a need to overcome gravity or achieve peace on Earth. To my mind, you need to distinguish between "need", desire, preference, and whim. Otherwise, it's hard to tell what you're talking about.
TSW: "The most important point through all of this is to maintain sight of what it is that we study: the main features of the microcosm in relation to the main features of the macrocosm."
BW: I think you just dropped your insistence on *universal* causation by adding the prefix "main features", which implies that whatever objects you're talking about have a unique identity, characterized by their features and essential characteristics.
TSW: "... we cannot have definite knowledge of a person’s needs until they have been met."
BW: So, your prior assertion of the need to predict has just disappeared, since you now assert that we can never know any motive prior to the act.
TSW: "The so-called 'need' of the microcosm is met only through a complementary 'need' of the macrocosm."
BW: Now, you're converting to a euphemistic "need", embodied in two arbitrary, subjective domains. You're making a flat assertion about vague abstracts. Why is not the inverse true: that the "need" of the macrocosm is met only through the "need" of the microcosm? Does an atom of carbon in my body "need" my next breath? I don't think so.
TSW: "Each tiny submicrocosm within the microcosm of Huck’s body moves toward univironmental equilibrium."
BW: Huck may "need" to adapt to the macrocosmic meteorite that will shortly destroy Huck, the apple, the tree and everything else in his microcosm. Or, the macrocosmic Huck may never eat the apple at all ... because his perceived hunger pains might actually be the microcosm of a burst appendix, seeking "equilibrium". The example is meaningless IF you're simply asserting that the universe is far too complex to ever identify the cause of Huck's act, much less predict it, then you're asserting that you have nothing relevant to say.
TSW: "Needs typically are seen by [systems philosophers] as internally derived, inborn, instinctive, and, above all, static."
BW: So, you are a systems philosopher: Huck's hunger is internally derived, inborn in his nature, his act is naturally instinctive, and his desire for
apples is static. It's strange how you bounce around from one paragraph to the next. Either you *hate* system philosophy, or you use it to explain
TSW: "... the god-given needs of the indeterminists ..."
BW: More hyperbole. System philosophers are almost universally atheists and determinists, not theists.
[GB: Huh? How do you know any of that? Folks who overemphasize the system are not even good classical determinists.]
TSW: "Any human behavior obviously not linked to what indeterminists regard as a legitimate need is considered irrational and uncaused."
BW: So, you would consider all human needs to be legitimate, rational, and determined? I need to jump tall buildings in a single bound. Legitimate? If not, why? Rational? By what standard? Determined? By what, other than my "need" to supersede my nature and the existence of gravity? Your statement is just hyperbole.
BW: I'll divide this chapter into several sections, which all deal with different causes of "needs".
Next: Heredity-Environment Muddle