Learn Your Assumptions

A recent forum had this interesting statement: "I find the whole discusson (sic) about the assumptions of science to be at best cognitive dissonance and at worst disingenuous."

I classify this indeterministic argument in the category of "We don't need no stinking assumptions!" It definitely involves "cognitive dissonance," because it is an argument made by those who hold contradictory presuppositions. As Collingwood (1940) maintained, presuppositions are assumptions that are held subconsciously. Once presuppositions are brought to light as assumptions, they can be studied in detail. Fundamental assumptions cannot be completely proven and they always have opposites (e.g., infinity vs. finity; conservation vs. creation). If we hold more than one of them, they must be consupponible. That is, they must not contradict one another. This is why those who do not accept "The Ten Assumptions of Science" (TTAOS) find arguments about assumptions to be "disingenuous." Reality keeps intruding on those holding indeterministic assumptions, most of which support religious views. For those so afflicted, I recommend a complete avoidance of TTAOS. For those who wish to unboggle their minds, I recommend the references below.

Glenn Borchardt

Borchardt, Glenn, 2004, Ten assumptions of science and the demise of 'cosmogony' (http://www.scientificphilosophy.com/Downloads/TTAOSATDOC.pdf): Proceedings of the Natural Philosophy Alliance, v. 1, no. 1, p. 3-6.

Borchardt, Glenn, 2004, The ten assumptions of science and the demise of cosmogony [abs.], in Proceedings of the American Association for the Advancement of Science, Southwestern and Rocky Mountain Division, Metropolitan State College of Denver and the Colorado-Wyoming Academy of Sciences, 2004, Volume Program with Abstracts, 79th Annual Meeting of AAAS-SWARM, p. 22-23.

Borchardt, Glenn, 2004, The ten assumptions of science: Toward a new scientific worldview, Lincoln, NE, iUniverse, 125 p.

Collingwood, R. G., 1940, An essay on metaphysics, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 354 p.